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ABSTRACT

Adults’ Perceptions of Children with Mental Illness Labels Who Tell Truths and Lies
by
Jessica McCurdy

Advisor: Angela Crossman

This study examined whether children’s truth- and lie-telling is perceived differently by
adults when the children have mental illness labels (MIL). Participants (N = 432) read a vignette
and watched a video from each of four veracity/motivation (i.e., prosocial truth, antisocial truth,
prosocial lie, antisocial lie) and child label (i.e., control, ADHD, depression, asthma) conditions.
After each video/vignette combination, participants rated their impressions of and responses
towards the child. Participants also completed measures of their implicit and explicit attitudes
towards mental illness. The results indicated participants had more negative perceptions of
children they rated higher on dangerousness and lower on control. Children without mental
illness labels were rated as more in control than children with mental illness labels. However,
while diagnoses did impact perceptions of the children, they did not predict perceptions of their
lie-telling, with one exception. Children labeled with depression who made antisocial statements
were rated more negatively than children labeled with ADHD. Overall, participants rated
children who made antisocial statements, told lies, and older children more negatively than
children who made prosocial statements, told truths, and younger children. They rated antisocial
lies worst and prosocial truths most positively, with antisocial truths and prosocial lies
iv

equivalent. Participants with high implicit and explicit biases rated children with mental illness
labels more negatively than participants with high implicit and low implicit biases and low
explicit and implicit biases. However, participants with low implicit and explicit biases were
unique in rating males more positively than females. Implications of these findings for future
research on the socialization of truth– and lie-telling in children with mental illness labels are
explored.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
History and culture are replete with famous instances of truth- and lie-telling, from
popular references to “Honest Abe” to Bill Clinton’s “I did not have sexual relations with that
woman.” Arguably, individuals’ decisions to tell a “truth” or “lie” are complicated by internal
and external motivations, as well as conflicting interpretations of what a “truth” or “lie” is. In the
case of lies, individuals communicate altered versions of reality to accomplish a goal. That goal
might be to protect another, to protect oneself, to save face, or perhaps to obtain some kind of
reward. While some might argue that a lie is a lie is a lie (Bok, 1978; DePaulo et al., 1996), most
individuals acknowledge the motivation behind a lie greatly impacts how that lie is perceived by
others (Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, & Cauffman, 2004). In fact, society actively encourages
“polite” or “white” lies, which are told to be nice or to protect another individual (DePaulo &
Jordan, 1982), in place of blunt honesty. In addition, society also accepts, if not actively
encourages, the use of lying in employment situations (i.e., “This is my dream job.” or “I am
fully committed to this company’s mission.”) (DePaulo et al., 1996).
Similarly, individuals tell the truth, or at least their understanding of the truth, for various
reasons. These reasons could range from a moral imperative, desire to hurt another (in the place
of a polite lie), or to establish a common understanding (aka “ground truth”), among others.
While truth-telling is often considered to be the default mode of communication between
members of society (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011), this is not always the case. In
certain social situations, individuals are actively encouraged to tell a lie, rather than the truth, in
order to protect another individual or group. In these situations, truth-telling may be reacted to
negatively. One of the tasks for members of a society is to learn the social rules and conventions
1

surrounding truth- and lie-telling behavior and it is likely that the reactions and feedback from
others is influential in this process (Brimbal & Crossman, 2016; Brimbal, Zottoli, & Crossman,
2016).
While the circumstances in which truth- and lie-telling occur have been previously
investigated, as have perceptions of truths and lies, what is less clear is how individual
characteristics of a truth- or lie-teller impact another’s perception of the truth- or lie-telling.
Specifically, it is unknown how mental health labels, such as anxious, depressed, or
schizophrenic, impact how a truth- or lie-teller is perceived. However, research on the tendency
of stigmatized individuals to be discredited by society (Farina, 1998; Goffman, 1963) suggests
that mental illness stigma may cause individuals to react differently towards truth- and lie-telling
by individuals with mental health labels than those without.
For example, when a child with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) tells a
lie or a blunt (i.e., socially inappropriate) truth, the child may not receive the same feedback as a
child without ADHD. Witnesses to the child’s truth/lie may expect the child with ADHD to be
incapable of controlling their impulses long enough to learn and/or follow the societal rules
surrounding truths and lies and, consequently, evaluate that behavior and the child less
negatively than they might otherwise and refrain from correcting the child’s behavior. As a
result, the child with ADHD may not be taught society’s conventions surrounding truth- and lietelling, which could put him at a further disadvantage when seeking employment or establishing
mutual relationships in adulthood. Similarly, beliefs about a depressed child’s dangerousness –
related to the increased prevalence of school shootings - might inhibit an adult from providing
corrective feedback for their lie-telling or blunt truth-telling, but could potentially exacerbate a
negative evaluation of the child and his behavior. Thus, to the extent that children with mental
2

illness labels receive different feedback about truth- and lie-telling, it could put them at a
disadvantage as adults when they encounter situations which require an understanding of
society’s expectations around truth- and lie-telling. As mental health stigma has already been
shown to negatively impact an individual’s employment prospects (Farina, 1998), relationships,
and community involvement (Pescosolido, 2013), it is important to determine whether
individuals with mental health labels are further disadvantaged due to receiving different
socialization messages in regards to truth- and lie-telling.
The goal of the current study is thus to begin addressing this previously unexplored issue
– whether a child’s truth and lie-telling is perceived differently by adults when the child has a
mental illness label. In theory, such perceptions and an adult’s subsequent reactions could
provide feedback (i.e., a source of socialization) that teaches children the social conventions
surrounding this social behavior. In order to explore this possibility, the following sections
provide an overview of the existing literature in areas that have not, to this point, been combined
by researchers. First, the socialization literature is reviewed, with a particular focus on the
socialization of truth- and lie-telling and the socialization of stigma and prejudice. This is
followed by an overview of research on mental illness stigma. The review concludes with the
proposal of a theoretical model for how mental illness stigma might impact the socialization of
children’s truth- and lie-telling. Informed by the proposed theoretical model, the final section
states the research questions and hypotheses this study aims to examine and the study’s
anticipated methodology.

3

CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
Socialization Theory
Socialization is broadly considered to be the process by which an individual learns the
skills, behaviors, and values that will allow them to become functional members of society
(Grusec & Hastings, 2014). However, the exact mechanisms by which this process takes place
has been the focus of numerous academic debates throughout the last century. Initially,
researchers were focused on creating a single, all-encompassing theory to explain the process of
development (Collins, 2011; Maccoby, 1992). Although Lev Vygotsky (1978) was one of the
first scientists to develop this type of universal theory through his writings on the influence of
sociocultural factors on cognitive development, his early death and necessity of translating his
works from Russian to English resulted in his ideas receiving little attention until the 1970’s
(John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996).
Jean Piaget (1936; 1952), a contemporary of Vygotsky, also developed a universal theory
regarding the development of human intelligence. While not directly related to socialization,
Piaget’s writings had a significant impact on the field of developmental psychology and later
played an important role in the development of social learning theories. Piaget proposed a
developmental stage theory, which conceptualized cognitive development as occurring through a
process driven by biological maturation and environmental experience (1936; 1952). Key aspects
of Piaget’s theory included the concepts of schemas, assimilation, and accommodation.
Piaget considered schemas to be the basic building blocks of knowledge and to provide
an individual with the ability to organize and use information from past experiences to inform
future actions (1936; 1952). As a person matured, Piaget theorized they developed schemas in
4

greater numbers and of greater complexity. Piaget also saw intellectual growth as a form of
adjustment to the world. Through accommodation (i.e., changing an existing schema to deal with
a new situation) and assimilation (i.e., using an existing schema to deal with a new situation), an
individual can incorporate new information into existing knowledge structures while continuing
to progress in their cognitive development (Piaget, 1936; Piaget, 1952).
Piaget’s stages of cognitive development are perhaps his most well-known contribution
to the field of developmental psychology and have informed theories surrounding the cognitive
prerequisites of lying behavior. He believed that all children go through the same four stages of
cognitive development in the same order, though children may attain the stages at different rates
or never attain later stages at all (Piaget, 1936; Piaget, 1952). In general, Piaget proposed
children would achieve the sensorimotor stage between birth and two years of age. The primary
achievement of the sensorimotor stage is object permanence – knowing an object is present, even
if it is not visible to the naked eye. The second stage, preoperational, was thought to be achieved
between the ages of two and seven. The primary achievement during this stage is the
development of symbolic thinking (i.e., the ability to make a thing stand for something other than
itself).
Piaget termed the third stage the concrete operational stage and considered this stage to
be a critical point in a child’s cognitive development. In the concrete operational stage, a child
becomes capable of logical, or operational, thought, and understands the principle of
conservation (i.e., something stays the same quantity, even though its appearance may change).
Piaget believed this stage was generally achieved between the ages of seven and eleven. The
final stage, formal operational, is believed to begin at age eleven and continue into adulthood.
During this period, an individual becomes capable of understanding abstract concepts and
5

logically testing hypotheses. As noted below, socialization of children’s moral and deceptive
behavior, which arguably rely on these cognitive abilities, is well underway by this age.
Another contributor to early socialization theories was Urie Bronfenbrenner.
Bronfenbrenner (1979) proposed an ecological systems model of child development which
emphasized the role of a child and his/her environment (both proximal and distal) on their
development. He identified five distinct ecological subsystems which guide and support
development. The first layer, the microsystem, is comprised of the child’s relationships with
structures he/she has direct contact with (i.e., parents, school, peers). The second layer, the
mesosystem, provides a point of connection between the primary structures in a child’s
microsystem (i.e., between a child’s parents and teachers).
The third layer, the exosystem, involves the larger social system with which the child
does not directly interact, but his/her microsystem structures do (i.e. parents’ work schedules,
local politics). At this level, the child is not directly involved with the structures, but may be
impacted by them either positively or negatively. The fourth layer, the macrosystem, is
comprised of a society’s cultural values, customs, and laws. The final layer, the chronosystem, is
concerned with the construct of time as it impacts the child, either externally (i.e., timing of a
sibling’s birth) or internally (i.e., the aging process). Of note, these layers exist in a complex
reciprocal interaction with each other, such that a child can influence their environment and be
influenced by their environment simultaneously. This dynamic model is discussed more below
with regard to children’s moral development.
Despite Piaget’s, Vygotsky’s, and Bronfenbrenner’s significant contributions to
psychology, their theories were not integrated into the socialization literature until well after their
initial publications. Thus, early investigations into universal theories of socialization were driven
6

primarily by proponents of behaviorism and psychoanalytic theory – the two dominant schools
of thought at the time (Collins, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014).
Universal theories. Psychoanalytic theory considered socialization to be the end result of
parental practices and children’s inherent drives and impulses coming into conflict (Kagan,
1982). As children were seen as being primarily driven by sexuality and aggression, it was the
duty of the parent to bring the child’s impulses under social control (Grusec & Hastings, 2014;
Maccoby, 1992). In addition, psychoanalysts viewed early childhood as a critical time period
during which many core characteristics are permanently acquired, with parents, particularly
mothers, considered the primary vehicles through which socialization occurred (Grusec &
Hastings, 2014; Kagan, 1982; Maccoby, 1992).
In contrast, behaviorists, led by B. F. Skinner, saw the child as a tabula rasa (blank slate)
with none of the inherent drives and impulses perceived by psychoanalysts (Cairns & Cairns,
2006; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Rather than viewing the events of early childhood as leading to
permanent, irreversible character development, behaviorists strived to demonstrate that specific
infant/child behaviors could be conditioned and extinguished at will (Collins, 2011; Watson,
1913). In addition, behaviorists acknowledged that individuals other than parents could have an
impact on a child’s socialization (i.e., teachers, peers) and that the process of socialization
continued beyond the early childhood years (Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Collins, 2011). In sum,
socialization was seen by behaviorists as merely another type of learning which occurred
throughout the lifespan and was acquired from a number of sources (Collins, 2011; Grusec &
Hastings, 2014; Kagan, 1982). However, it is important to note that both behaviorists and
psychoanalysts saw parents as the primary conduits through which socialization occurred.
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The next wave of researchers attempted to reconcile the two theories by translating
psychoanalytic principles into behaviorist terms so that they could be studied (Collins, 2011;
Grusec & Hastings, 2014). The concepts of reinforcement and punishment were used as the
central antecedent mechanisms, while secondary drives were considered to develop out of
biological needs (Collins, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). For example, to examine fixations
during the early stages of development, researchers investigated the processes of weaning and
toilet training using reinforcement and punishment (Maccoby, 1992). Unfortunately, the scope of
the studies conducted during this period was rather narrow due to the limited focus of
psychodynamic theories. That is, the studies generally focused on children’s aggression, desire
for parental approval, toilet training, weaning, and other events occurring within the first 5 years
of a child’s life (the critical years for personality formation according to psychoanalytic theory),
and neglected to investigate broader areas of socialization, such as learning to share, acquisition
of language, and the development of manners (Cairns & Cairns, 2006; Kagan, 1982; Maccoby,
1992). Moreover, the results of these studies were largely unsuccessful and found little relation
between the psychoanalytic concepts of interest and the parental practices manipulated using
behaviorist principles (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957).
Domain specific theories. Following these unsuccessful efforts to develop and support
one comprehensive theory of socialization, a number of influential theories aimed at explaining
discrete domains of socialization emerged (Collins, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Of those,
the most relevant are attachment theory, social learning theory, and guided learning theory.
Derived from John Bowlby’s (1969) studies of non-human primates, attachment theory views the
bond between parent and child as the result of an evolutionary instinct to create reciprocal
behaviors in parent and child that will sustain the child’s development (Ainsworth & Bell, 1969;
8

Grusec & Hastings, 2014). At its core, the theory revolves around how a child learns to respond
when threatened and the impact of that response style on various interpersonal relationships
throughout their lifespan (Dykas & Cassidy, 2011; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Attachment
theorists emphasize the importance of an infant’s relationship with their primary caregiver in
shaping their attachment style. If an infant has a primary caregiver who does not respond to their
needs, or responds inconsistently, the child can acquire an enduring maladaptive response style
in relationships (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1971; Bowlby, 1973; Marvin & Britner, 2008).
However, it is important to note that while attachment theory emphasizes the importance of a
primary caregiver in a child’s development, it fails to explain the exact mechanism through
which the caregiver impacts the child’s socialization (Grusec & Hastings, 2014).
In 1978, Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues created a classification system for the
various types of attachment a child could demonstrate. A secure attachment style (i.e., infant is
upset when caregiver leaves and happy upon their return) suggests the child is confident their
caregiver will consistently respond appropriately to their needs (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Studies
have demonstrated that children with secure attachment styles are more likely to have high selfesteem, strong social support networks, and long-term, trusting adult relationships (Feeney &
Noller, 1990; Simpson, 1980; Sroufe, 2005). Alternatively, a child can develop an insecure
attachment style, of which three specific subtypes have been identified: anxious-resistant,
anxious-avoidant, and disorganized (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Main & Solomon, 1986).
An anxious-resistant attachment style (i.e., infant is extremely upset when caregiver
leaves and is ambivalent upon their return) develops when caregivers unpredictably vacillate
between responding to the child’s needs and ignoring the child’s needs (Ainsworth et al., 1978).
This pattern of attachment is often found in abused children (McCarthy & Taylor, 1999). An
9

anxious-avoidant attachment style (i.e., child shows little emotion when caregiver departs or
returns) develops when a caregiver is consistently unresponsive to a child’s needs (Ainsworth et
al., 1978). The last type of insecure attachment style, disorganized attachment, was added to the
classification system several years after the creation of Ainsworth’s initial classifications due to
difficulty categorizing all infants into one of the three original attachment styles (Main &
Solomon, 1986). Infants with a disorganized attachment style tend to show fear, a simultaneous
display of contradictory emotions, or dissociation upon their caregiver’s return (Carlson,
Cicchetti, Barnett, & Braunwald, 1989; Main & Solomon, 1990; Van Ijzendoorn, Schuengel, &
Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999). Children who have been placed in multiple foster homes at a
young age often display this type of attachment (Crittenden & Landini, 2011). Overall, studies
have found that children with insecure attachment styles are more likely to have difficulties
regulating their emotions and behavior, establishing relationships, and developing a positive selfimage (Sroufe, 2005; Van Ijzendoorn, Schuengel, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1999).
In contrast, social learning theory examines how children’s observational learning (i.e.,
learning through observing others) and group participation influence the socialization process
(Bandura, 1977; Grusec & Davidov, 2010; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Rather than focusing on a
single individual, such as the primary caregiver, social learning theory acknowledges
socialization occurs through a variety of social interactions. The attachment between a child and
caregiver is seen as merely a form of leverage the caregiver can use in their efforts to socialize
the child and is not considered to be qualitatively different from the attachments a child can form
with their peers or teachers (Bandura, 1965; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Albert Bandura (1977)
demonstrated the concept of social learning in a classic experiment wherein children were asked
to observe an adult modeling either aggressive or non-aggressive play. Bandura found the child’s
10

later play was directly impacted by their earlier observation of the adult. Children who observed
the adult playing aggressively were significantly more likely to engage in aggressive behavior
than children who were exposed to the non-aggressive model (Bandura, 1977). In short, Bandura
determined that learning could take place solely through observation and without the presence of
rewards or attachment.
Later studies demonstrated that socialization through observational learning can be
strengthened through the use of same-sex models and models with personal relationships with
the participants (Grusec & Hastings, 2014; Perry & Bussey, 1979). In addition, anthropological
and cultural research has shown a strong link between observational learning with the intent of
participation at a later time and the socialization of cultural norms and values (Odden & Rochat,
2005; Rogoff et al., 2007). While this can and does occur outside of the family unit, there is
evidence that family traditions and routines are integral to a child developing a sense of social
identity and belonging (Fiese et al., 2002; Wolin & Bennett, 1984).
Lastly, guided learning theory emphasizes the importance of formal instruction by a more
experienced individual as the mechanism by which culturally relevant skills and knowledge are
transmitted (Vygotsky, 1978). The more experienced individual is expected to work within the
child’s “zone of proximal development” by presenting them with material that is just beyond
their current level of understanding (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1984). Also known as
scaffolding, this process allows the child to slowly increase their level of understanding as it
becomes developmentally appropriate. While the concept of guided learning has been primarily
applied to cognitive functioning, there has been some limited research conducted applying
guided learning theories to moral (Turner & Berkowitz, 2005), socioemotional (Laible & Panfile,
2009), and physical (Exner, 1990) development.
11

Integrating theories. Drawing on prior domain specific theories of socialization, Grusec
and Davidov (2010) developed a theory of socialization that integrates the theories discussed
above, while accounting for their occasionally conflicting propositions (Figure 1). They propose
there are five primary domains of socialization, with each domain representing a distinct
socialization process and child outcome. In addition, their approach emphasizes the importance
of the child’s role in their own socialization, consistent with Piaget’s theorizing, and the impact
of cultural differences on the weight given to each domain, consistent with Vygotsky’s
principles. The five domains are: Protection, Reciprocity, Control, Guided Learning, and Group
Participation.

Protection

Group
Participation

Reciprocity
Socialization

Guided
Learning

Control

Figure 1. Integrative theory of socialization. This figure illustrates the five distinct domains of
child socialization proposed by Grusec and Davidov (2010).
The protection domain, drawing from attachment theory, is concerned with how a parent
responds to a child’s distress. For example, studies have shown that parents who respond
appropriately create a secure attachment with their child, which is related to improved emotion
12

regulation (Cassidy, 1994), distress tolerance (Cassidy, 1994; Davidov & Grusec, 2006),
empathy (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998), and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes,
1998) by the child. The second domain, reciprocity, involves parental response to a child’s
reasonable requests. When the response is appropriate, research has shown it promotes
cooperation and compliance by the child (Kochanska & Murray, 2000; Parpal & Maccoby,
1985).
The third domain, control, refers to the appropriate use of authority to alter a child’s
behavior to conform to the socialization agent’s goals. While the manner in which this authority
is appropriately exercised can vary depending on the parent/child relationship, it ideally leads to
the internalization of moral and principled behavior by the child (Bugental & Grusec, 2006).
However, this domain is particularly difficult to evaluate empirically due to the complexity of
establishing definitions of what constitutes “appropriate” authority and “moral and principled
behavior.” The most consistent finding in this domain is that the effectiveness of parental control
strategies is dependent on a number of parent and child variables, such as temperament, sex, age,
mood, and nature of the offense (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994).
The guided learning domain involves the facilitation of a child’s cognitive, physical,
vocational, social, and emotional skills with the goal of improving their ability to successfully
navigate their cultural group. While there is limited research on the impact of guided learning on
socialization, studies have supported the use of guided learning in related areas, such as
acquiring socioemotional skills (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1996; Laible, 2004; Laible & Song,
2006), improving social interaction with peers (Leve & Fagot, 1997; Vandell & Wilson, 1987),
and facilitating moral and character development (Turner & Berkowitz, 2005). The last domain,
group participation, refers to the inclusion of children in social groups where they can learn
13

social customs, cultural practices, and group norms through observation and develop a social
identity. Multiple studies have demonstrated the impact of observational learning, particularly
observational learning with the intent to eventually participate, on the behavior and the
acquisition of knowledge among children (Bandura, 1977; Fiese et al., 2002; Miller & Goodnow,
1995; Rogoff et al., 2007).
A typical individual is likely to be influenced by each of these domains numerous times
throughout their life and, as a result, acquire the skills, behaviors, and values which indicate their
affiliation with a specific society (Grusec & Davidov, 2010). It is through these domains, acting
alone and in concert with one another, that an individual also develops morals, principles,
prejudices, and standards of behavior (Grusec & Davidov, 2010). This paper looks specifically at
the socialization of lying behavior, which appears to be influenced primarily by the group
participation and control domains, and how other socialized values, such as stigma, can impact
the socialization process.
Socialization of Truth- and Lie-Telling
To be fully socialized with regard to truth- and lie-telling, an individual must understand
the purpose of truth- and lie-telling and the societal contexts in which truth- versus lie-telling is
considered appropriate or inappropriate. As very little research to date has been conducted
specifically on truth-telling (though see “A Note on Truth-Telling” below), this section focuses
primarily on lie-telling. With regards to the purpose of lying, speech act theory provides a
concise framework to understand children’s lying or deceptive behaviors (Austin, 1962; Lee,
2013). It argues that verbal utterances serve both descriptive and intentional functions, and can
serve as tools in accomplishing specific social objectives (Austin, 1962). In other words, speech
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act theory considers lying to be the act of using words to deceive (Lee, 2000) and children must
be socialized in how to do so (or not) appropriately.
As is true for any type of speech, evaluation of the act of lie-telling involves
consideration of both intentionality (i.e., mental state) and conventionality (i.e., social rules)
from the perspective of both the lie-teller and the recipient (Lee, 2000; Lee, 2013). Accordingly,
when studying lie-telling it is important to examine an individual’s motivation and their
understanding of social norms in regards to lie-telling behavior. Since socialization occurs
progressively throughout childhood, it is likely that children’s understand of lie-telling evolves
and they alter their lie- and truth-telling behavior as they mature to more closely meet societal
expectations (Bussey, 1999; Popliger, Talwar, & Crossman, 2011; Xu et al., 2010). For example,
Bussey (1999) found that 4-year-olds had more difficultly correctly identifying lies and truths
than older children (aged 8 and 11), particularly in the case of “white,” or prosocial, lies. These
results suggest that as children mature they develop an understanding of the concept of prosocial
lying, which they did not possess at a younger age.
Researchers have identified two categories in which the majority of lies fall: prosocial
lies and antisocial lies. Prosocial lies consist of “white” or “blue” lies, which are told to protect
another individual (white) or the community (blue) (Barnes, 1994; Talwar & Lee, 2002).
Antisocial lies are told in order to protect the lie-teller from some negative outcome or for
personal gain (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002).
These types of lies have been examined among children in a multitude of contexts, with a
primary focus on their understanding of lie-telling, development of the ability to lie, the
influence of social conventions on lying, and lying in forensic situations (e.g., as an eyewitness
to a crime) (Bussey, 1992; DePaulo et al., 1996; Talwar & Lee, 2002).
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Although the majority of the research on lie-telling in these various contexts has occurred
in the past two decades, Darwin published the first article on lying in 1877. Interest in the topic
then became dormant until Piaget’s seminal work on children’s moral understanding of lying in
1932. Around the same time, Hartshorne and May (1928) published a study on dishonest
behavior in children. It then took over 50 years for their work to be continued by Lewis, Stanger,
and Sullivan in 1989, through a study examining deception in three-year-old children. Since
then, interest in children’s lying behavior has remained robust (Lee, 2013; Talwar & Crossman,
2011).
The development of moral behavior. While it is theoretically possible to examine lietelling without addressing morality more generally, like examining a single pixel in a
photograph, doing so misses the broader context in which that behavior develops. Thus,
exploration of moral development provides a more robust understanding of the socialization of
lie-telling.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1971), following in the footsteps of Jean Piaget, developed one of
the first comprehensive theories regarding the development of moral behavior. In its final
iteration, Kohlberg’s theory consisted of six developmental stages which spanned an individual’s
lifetime. The six stages were grouped into three levels of two stages each: pre-conventional
morality, conventional morality, post-conventional morality (Kohlberg, 1971).
Kohlberg (1971) considered the pre-conventional level of morality to be primarily
characterized by the tendency to determine the morality of an action by examining its direct
consequence. While this level of morality is most commonly seen in children, adults can also
remain indefinitely at this level (Kohlberg, 1971). In stage one, an individual is focused on the
direct consequences of their actions on themselves in determining the morality of their behavior
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(i.e. the more severe the punishment, the more evil the action) (Kohlberg, 1971). In stage two, an
individual develops self-interest and determines what is “right” by determining what action
would have the best outcome for themselves (Kohlberg, 1971).
The conventional level of morality is characterized by the tendency to judge the morality
of an action by evaluating it against societal mores, values, and expectations (Kohlberg, 1971).
Generally, adolescents and adults achieve this level of moral reasoning. In stage three, an
individual strives to conform to society’s rules in order to gain approval from others (Kohlberg,
1971). In stage four, an individual moves from conforming to society’s expectations in order to
gain approval to understanding the importance of obeying laws and social conventions in
maintaining a functioning society (Kohlberg, 1971).
The final, post-conventional, level is characterized by an individual’s realization they are
an entity separate from society and have the ability to disobey societal rules that are at odds with
their own principles (Kohlberg, 1971). It is considered fairly rare for someone to achieve this
level of moral development. In stage five, an individual perceives laws as social contracts that
should be altered when it would benefit the majority of the population (Kohlberg, 1971). In stage
six, laws are evaluated in regards to their contribution to justice, and an individual is obligated to
disobey unjust laws (Kohlberg, 1971). Kohlberg also hypothesized about a stage seven, in which
an individual combines religion with moral reasoning, and transitional stages, in which an
individual fluctuates between two stages of moral reasoning while in the process of transitioning
from one stage to another, but these were not officially added to the theory (Kohlberg &
Ryncarz, 1990).
One controversial aspect of Kohlberg’s theory was his assertion that men were more
likely to achieve the highest stage of moral reasoning than women (Kohlberg, 1971). While
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Kohlberg’s research did support this statement, it raised questions of whether Kohlberg’s theory
was inherently biased towards men (Gilligan, 1982). According to Carol Gilligan (1982), men
tend to emphasize the role of justice in moral reasoning, whereas women tend to emphasize the
role of caring. Since Kohlberg’s theory emphasized the role of justice in determining the
attainment of stages, Gilligan (1982) argued women were excluded from higher levels of moral
reasoning in Kohlberg’s theory by default.
To address this issue, Gilligan (1982) adapted Kohlberg’s stages to create a womenspecific model of moral development called the “Stages of the Ethics of Care.” Gilligan retained
Kohlberg’s original three levels, pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional, but
altered their definitions based on her research on women’s development of moral behavior. Like
Kohlberg, Gilligan (1982) considered the pre-conventional level to be characterized by a focus
on survival and self-interest. However, Gilligan (1982) described the conventional level as being
characterized by a tendency to prioritize selflessness and caring about others, and the postconventional level to be characterized by acceptance of responsibility for one’s actions and
asserting control over one’s life.
Urie Bronfenbrenner also developed a theory surrounding the development of moral
behavior. However, unlike Kohlberg and Gilligan, Bronfenbrenner considered the influence of
culture and a person’s environment on their moral development (Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner,
1976). His theory consisted of five moral orientations, which are somewhat analogous to
Kohlberg’s stages. The first orientation, self-oriented morality, is similar to Kohlberg’s preconventional morality, with the individual’s focus primarily on self-gratification (Garbarino &
Bronfenbrenner, 1976).
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The next three orientations, authority-oriented morality, peer-oriented morality, and
collective-oriented morality, are closely related to Kohlberg’s conventional morality. In
authority-oriented morality, the individual considers authority figures to have the final word on
issues of morality, whereas in peer-oriented morality, the individual’s morality is determined by
their peers (Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner, 1976). In collective-oriented morality, individual
interests are superseded by the goals of an individual’s group. Bronfenbrenner’s final orientation,
objectively oriented morality, is considered analogous to Kohlberg’s post-conventional morality.
Within this orientation, the individual has identified universal principles regarding morality that
are independent from individual or group interests (Garbarino & Bronfenbrenner, 1976).
In sum, across all three theories there is a consensus that the development of moral
behavior can be separated into distinct stages that are attained at an individual’s unique pace (and
sometimes not at all). There also appears to be a consistent connection between an individual’s
primary focus shifting from the self to others and their understanding of higher levels of moral
reasoning that are more abstract and less rigid. As discussed below, this suggests the
development of moral reasoning occurs many years after the development of lying.
The development of lie-telling. The results of studies that investigated the development
of lying behaviors in children suggest children tell their first lies in the preschool years (Newton,
Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003). These lies tend to be unsophisticated and
motivated by a desire to avoid punishment or to receive a reward (Newton et al., 2000;
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wilson et al., 2003). Prosocial lies, on the other hand, tend to appear
later on (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Talwar & Lee, 2002). The later onset of prosocial lie telling
is thought to be due to children’s inability to understand the purpose of prosocial lies (i.e., to
protect another) or the complex social rules regarding their appropriate use (Talwar & Crossman,
19

2011). In addition, prosocial lies might cause greater cognitive and emotional strain by requiring
the child to inhibit their own goals and motivations in order to meet another person’s, potentially
competing, goals (Talwar & Lee, 2008). However, it has also been suggested children are
capable of telling what appear to be prosocial lies at an early age, but the motivation behind the
lie may be self-oriented (i.e., to avoid negative consequences; Popliger et al., 2011; Talwar,
Murphy, & Lee, 2007; Xu et al., 2010). As the child matures, the motivation behind prosocial
lies likely shifts from self-oriented to other-oriented goals (i.e., to prevent hurt feelings; Popliger
et al., 2011).
To better understand the foundation for the development of children’s lie-telling ability,
researchers have examined the relationship between children’s theory of mind development and
lying. Lying essentially requires the child to understand the difference between what they know
and what others know, and that others’ knowledge can be manipulated through deception
(Talwar & Crossman, 2011). However, the extent of the understanding needed to tell or
recognize a lie is still unclear, as is whether the type of lie being examined (i.e., prosocial v.
antisocial) impacts that answer (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2008). In general,
researchers have attempted to answer these questions by examining whether a child’s lie-telling
abilities are correlated with a theory of mind developmental stage. Specifically, researchers have
concentrated on the differences in lie-telling abilities between children who are able to predict
the causal impact of creating a false belief in another person (i.e., “If I said I did not look at the
toy, then I must not know what the toy is.”; second-order theory of mind understanding),
children who are limited to merely representing a belief that is at odds with reality (i.e., “I didn’t
look at the toy.”; first-order theory of mind understanding), and children who have not yet
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realized the separation between their spoken words and their thoughts (Talwar & Crossman,
2011).
Since children who have not yet attained second-order theory of mind understanding
struggle to maintain a lie when asked follow-up questions, it is thought the ability to deceive will
progressively improve as a child achieves each theory of mind stage and increases their overall
cognitive abilities (Frye & Moore, 1991; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007). Talwar, Gordon, and
Lee (2007) were able to directly test this hypothesis through an experiment which examined age
differences in self-serving lies in children aged 6 to 11 years old. Their results found a positive
correlation between children’s attainment of second-order belief understanding and their ability
to successfully maintain a lie while being questioned. Children who had not attained secondorder belief understanding still provided an initial lie, but were unable to remain consistent in
their denial (Talwar et al., 2007).
Additional support for this hypothesis was provided through a recent study demonstrating
the emergence of lying behavior in children after they were provided with theory of mind
training (Ding et al., 2015). Initially, the 3-year-old children were unable to lie; after one month
of theory of mind training, they were consistently capable of lying. In contrast, the control group,
which received training on physical concepts, was significantly less likely to lie than the theory
of mind trained group (Ding et al., 2015). Finally, the connection between theory of mind
understanding and lying behavior is also supported by studies demonstrating poor lying abilities
in children with autism - a disorder frequently associated with deficient theory of mind
development (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992; Talwar et al., 2012).
In regards to cognitive abilities, there has been some indication that deficits in executive
functioning skills (i.e., self-regulation, inhibition, planning) may be linked to difficulties in lying.
21

Of the few studies to investigate this hypothesis, one found a significant positive relationship
between executive functioning skills and success in physical acts of deception (Carlson et al.,
1998). While this study did not directly examine lie-telling behavior, it does suggest that deficits
in cognitive abilities, particularly executive functioning skills, may be related to difficulties in
deception (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). Another study found a significant positive relationship
between a child’s executive functioning skills and their likelihood of lying (Talwar & Lee,
2008). Specifically, the study found that a child’s ability to inhibit the impulse to report a
transgression when questioned was positively related to their performance on a Stroop task
(Talwar & Lee, 2008).
Socialization of lie-telling. In addition to developing a theory of mind, children must
also develop an understanding of the social norms involved in lie-telling. While, in general,
society tends to consider lying “bad” or “undesirable,” there are many situations in which society
encourages lie-telling (Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Talwar & Crossman, 2011). In
particular, children learn from an early age to tell prosocial lies in order to avoid hurting
another’s feelings or to protect another from some form of harm (Talwar et al., 2007). It is
important to note that, while all cultures practice deception in one form or another, the social
norms surrounding lying can differ significantly (Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman & Lee, 2007; Lee et
al., 1997). Those children who fail to develop an understanding of socially acceptable lying will
likely have difficulty navigating social situations, such as school and work, which tend to require
a number of “white” or “polite” lies in order to achieve success.
As can be inferred from society’s tendency to distinguish between prosocial and
antisocial lies, individuals can have very different reactions to another’s lie depending on the
perceived motivation behind it. In general, prosocial lies tend to evoke positive reactions – or at
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least less negative reactions, than telling the blunt truth - whereas antisocial lies tend to evoke
negative reactions (Talwar & Crossman, 2011; Talwar et al., 2007). It is through this feedback
that children likely learn when and how to deliver various types of lies (Popliger et al., 2011).
This feedback could be received from anyone the child is exposed to, though parents, teachers,
and peers are likely to exhibit a greater influence on the child’s behavior due to their consistent
presence (Cole & Mitchell, 1998; Talwar & Lee, 2002). To date, however, little research has
been conducted on the socialization of children’s lie-telling, despite its likely importance in
shaping lie-telling behavior.
The one study that has examined the socialization of lie-telling behavior surveyed 146
parents about their beliefs regarding lie-telling, how they socialized their children about lietelling, and whether their children’s actual behavior corresponded with their parents’ attempts at
socialization (Lavoie, Leduc, Crossman, & Talwar, 2016). The study found a higher frequency of
self-serving lie-telling among children whose parents conveyed the message that lying was
sometimes acceptable, compared to children whose parents conveyed it was never acceptable
(Lavoie et al., 2016).
Studies that have examined the socialization of prosocial behavior in general have
consistently found that children exposed to adults modeling prosocial behavior exhibit greater
prosocial behavior themselves for days or weeks afterwards (Grusec, 1992; McGrath, Wilson, &
Frassetto, 1995). However, the effects varied with the length of exposure to the prosocial
stimulus, the degree of familiarity with the model (i.e. stranger v. parent), and individual child
characteristics (such as age and gender; Grusec & Hastings, 2014). Of note, studies showed
parents and teachers to have a stronger impact on prosocial behavior than siblings and peers,
though all exhibited some influence (Grusec & Hastings, 2014).
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Given the propositions that children’s truth- and lie-telling is socialized by those around
them, and the socialization process is impacted by a child’s individual characteristics, it is likely
that characteristics that remain stable across a child’s life span (i.e., race, gender, physical
disabilities, etc.) could significantly affect the feedback they receive in regards to lie-telling. A
mental health diagnosis, for example, could create situations in which children are not
appropriately socialized about lying. This could occur because the adult feels uncomfortable
correcting a child with a mental health diagnosis or attributes the socially unacceptable lie-telling
behavior to the mental health diagnosis and, as a result, fails to provide appropriate feedback
because they believe it will have no effect. In addition, the presence or absence of stereotypes or
stigma surrounding the mental health diagnosis could significantly impact the content, tone, and
frequency of the feedback. Although no studies have examined this issue directly, the literature
on the socialization of stigma, and mental health stigma in general, provides insight to the
potential processes at work.
A note on truth-telling. In comparison to lie-telling, little attention has been paid to how
truth-tellers are perceived. While this is understandable, considering the societal expectation of
“truth” being the default form of communication (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011),
there are instances in which truth-tellers provoke a negative reaction in listeners. In particular,
statements that could be categorized as “blunt” truths can provoke negative reactions (Brimbal &
Crossman, 2016; Brimbal, Zottoli, & Crossman, 2016). Blunt truths are statements that, while
true, are likely to hurt the feelings of the intended recipient or group and might generally be
replaced by “polite” or “white” lies. For example, a child who states, “This is the worst food
ever!” when asked about his grandmother’s cooking might be reprimanded for his honesty and
instructed (either directly or indirectly) to state a polite lie (i.e. “The food is great, Grandma!”) if
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presented with the question again. In these situations, society has deemed polite lies to be more
socially acceptable than blunt truths, despite society’s stated preference for the truth in all other
matters (with the caveat that cultural norms surrounding blunt truths differ across different
societies and cultures – Fu et al., 2007).
Another interesting aspect of truth-telling that has received little attention by researchers
is the phenomenon of telling the truth and then being accused of lying. For example, many
women who are sexually assaulted do not report the crime to the police due to fear that they will
not be believed (Edwards et al., 2011). Relatedly, there have also been recent reports of African
American female doctors being accused of lying about their level of education by individuals
who could not believe an African American woman was capable of becoming a doctor (Wible,
2016). Although not the focus of the current investigation, these types of events demonstrate the
importance of considering the actual and perceived truth of a matter separately in evaluating
individuals’ truths and lies, as well as additional ways in which characteristics of a truth- or lieteller might impact perceptions of their truths and lies, through the process of stigmatization, as
explored below.
Socialization of Stigma
The concept of stigma originates with the Greeks, who cut or burned marks onto the
bodies of criminals, slaves, and traitors in order to brand them as “tainted” or “immoral”
individuals who should be avoided by society (Goffman, 1963). Since then, stigma has evolved
beyond a physical mark and now applies to any characteristic, visible or not, that incites social
censure (Bos, Pryor, Reeder, & Stutterheim, 2013). In 1963, Goffman provided what is now
considered to be the standard definition of stigma. He stated stigma was a “‘mark’ that signals to
others that an individual possesses an attribute reducing him or her from ‘whole and usual’ to
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‘tainted and discounted’” (as cited by Pescosolido, 2013, p. 4). This “mark” could be a physical
deformity, mental illness, race, gender, or religion, among other characteristics. Significantly,
stigma could only be enacted in a social environment and was characterized by exclusion from
full participation in society (Pescosolido, 2013). Since stigma is not considered to reside within
the person being stigmatized, but rather within the social context that it occurs, what is
considered stigmatizing can change from one social context to another (Crocker, Major, &
Steele, 1998).
Because stigmatizing attitudes vary as a function of social context, individuals in a social
group likely undergo a process of socialization through which they learn what characteristics are
stigmatized in their social context. Indeed, it is likely that this socialization occurs early in
development. Corrigan (2004) proposed a four-component model to explain the social-cognitive
processes that might lead to the stigmatization of a “marked” person in a social group: cues
(labels, symptoms, social skills deficits, and physical appearance), stereotypes (knowledge
structures concerning a marked social group), prejudiced attitudes (evaluative cognitive and
affective responses), and discriminatory behaviors (negative actions) (see also Link’s modified
labeling theory; Link et al., 1989). This model has been successfully applied in examining stigma
towards mental health treatment (Luoma et al., 2007; Pederson & Vogel, 2007; Vogel, Wade, &
Haake, 2006), stigma towards mental disorders across cultures (Griffiths et al., 2006), and the
impact of programs challenging mental illness stigma (Corrigan & Shapiro, 2010), among others.
It is through prejudiced attitudes and, more often, discriminatory behaviors that “marked”
persons are made aware of the existence of stigma and experience its harmful effects (i.e. loss of
employment opportunities, ostracization, etc.) (Corrigan, 2004). Some theorists have argued that
the increased awareness of mental illness stigma has decreased discriminatory behaviors and
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lessened the harmful effects of stigma (Link et al., 1989), nevertheless, research has consistently
linked mental illness stigma to discriminatory behaviors and harmful effects. Moreover, while
only the concept of public stigma will be addressed here, it is important to note that stigma can
also occur in the forms of self-stigma (the internalization of negative beliefs about a stigmatized
condition one possesses), stigma by association (negative reactions to individuals associated with
a stigmatized person), and structural stigma (legitimization of stigma by cultural institutions)
(Pryor & Reeder, 2011; Yanos, Roe, Markus, & Lysaker, 2008).
While the terms are often used interchangeably, it is also important to consider whether
there is a discernable difference between stigma and prejudice. In defining prejudice, most
contemporary researchers still refer to Allport’s (1954) description of prejudice as “antipathy
based on a faulty or inflexible generalization” (p. 300; Dixon, Durrheim, Kerr, & Thomae,
2013). Historically, the term prejudice has been used within areas of research that focus on
intergroup domination and exploitation (i.e., ethnicity, gender), whereas stigma has been more
frequently used in research on norm enforcement and disease avoidance (i.e., disabilities, mental
illness) (Phelan, Link, & Dovidio, 2008). However, some researchers have argued that stigma is
merely a form of prejudice (Corrigan, 2004). Others have suggested that the key difference
between the two terms is stigma’s condition of a perceived “negative deviance,” whereas
prejudice can occur in the absence of a perceived deviance (Bos et al., 2013). For the purposes of
this paper, the terms stigma and prejudice will be used interchangeably, as both bodies of
literature inform understanding of the developmental origins of stigmatization and how some
individuals come to be treated as “tainted and discounted” in different social contexts.
Development of stigma and prejudice. The origins of stigma are a source of
considerable academic debate from which a number of theories have emerged to explain how
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prejudicial beliefs are passed from one generation to another. Early research on the topic focused
primarily on identifying the developmental stage at which prejudicial beliefs are first seen. One
possibility is that they emerge from early in-group preferences. For instance, research has
demonstrated an own-race preference for novel faces in children as young as 3 months old (BarHaim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006; Kelly et al., 2005). This in-group preference does not appear
to be driven by an inherent bias favoring the in-group, as infants did not demonstrate a similar
preference in social interactions with peers (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). However, by 5 years of
age, an in-group bias appears to develop, with children expressing preference for own-race
friends and toys used by own-race children (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). Thus, it is important to
note that while in-group preferences can appear early, they are not fixed and are not necessarily
indicative of prejudicial bias (i.e., negative attitudes or beliefs regarding an out-group) (Killen,
Hitti, & Mulvey, 2015).
Interestingly, studies have found an increase in prejudicial expression (i.e., the adoption
and communication of negative beliefs about a group) between the ages of 3 and 7, followed by a
decrease until age 12 (Aboud, 1988). It is hypothesized this decrease in prejudicial expression at
7 years old is due to increased awareness of individuals’ various characteristics - which reduces
the tendency to define an individual by a single, potentially unfavorable, characteristic (Killen,
Hitti, & Mulvey, 2015). For example, a 5-year-old might consider his classmate’s skin color to
be their only identifying characteristic, whereas an 8-year-old is capable of understanding that
skin color is just one of many characteristics that could be used to describe another person.
Unfortunately, a decrease in prejudicial expression does not necessarily indicate a
decrease in prejudicial stereotypes or beliefs. Prejudice can exist at a conscious level (explicit
bias) and an unconscious level (implicit bias) (Killen, Hitti, & Mulvey, 2015). Thus, a decrease
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in prejudicial expression, a form of explicit bias, does not necessarily indicate a corresponding
decrease in implicit bias. In fact, a study of 11- to 14-year-olds found greater implicit prejudicial
evaluations among older participants than younger participants (Degner & Wentura, 2010). This
suggests a potentially inverse relationship between explicit and implicit bias in children, with
implicit bias increasing as explicit bias decreases.
However, the acquisition of biases can vary depending on a participant’s group
membership. As in-group biases tend to form primarily within high status groups, members of
“low” status groups tend to exhibit non-biased or out-group biased attitudes (Bigler, Brown, &
Markell, 2001). For example, boys (a “high” status group) tend to develop biases favoring the
male gender, whereas girls (a “low” status group) tend to develop non-biased gender attitudes
(Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993). Similarly, white children tend to develop biases favoring
their own race, whereas African American children tend to develop non-biased or out-group
biased (i.e., favoring the white race) attitudes (Newheiser & Olson, 2011; Spencer & MarkstromAdams, 1990).
When group memberships intersect (i.e., identifying as “black” and “male”), it can lead
to conflicting or exacerbated in-group preferences and out-group biases (Cole, 2009; Simien,
2007). To date, there has been little research conducted on the impact of intersecting group
memberships on the development of biases or stigma. However, it is likely that the salience of a
particular group membership to a given situation will have an impact on an individual’s biases.
In addition, if an individual considers himself a member of two in-groups that share a bias, that
bias is more likely to become integrated into the individual’s identity than a bias that is not
shared, or even contradicted, by his in-groups.
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Researchers also investigated how group preferences or biases are transmitted from
generation to generation. A popular view, expressed by Gordon Allport in The Nature of
Prejudice, theorized that “up to puberty, children’s prejudices are mostly secondhand” and
“parroted views of the parents” (1954, pp. 297). Drawing on Piaget’s (1952) theory of the
acquisition of cognitive concepts, Allport (1954) proposed children formed prejudicial beliefs
through two socialization processes: adopting parental prejudice through the direct transfer of
words or gestures and developing prejudice through immersion in a home environment which
allows prejudice to form. In the 1980’s, Frances Aboud (1988) directly tested this theory through
a meta-analysis of all empirical studies examining the relationship between a parent and child’s
prejudicial beliefs. The results were completely at odds with the prevailing consensus at the time
– no reliable correlation was found between parent and child prejudice.
Developmental theories of the socialization of stigma and prejudice. Following
Aboud’s surprising results, several comprehensive theories were developed to address the
apparent disconnect between parents’ and children’s prejudice. The first, Social-Cognitive
Developmental Theory (SCDT), was developed by Aboud in an attempt to explain his findings
(1988, 2008). It drew on Piagetian theory and hypothesized that prejudice develops parallel to
changes in a child’s dominant mode of information processing (i.e., affective, perceptual,
cognitive) and dominant focus of attention (i.e., self, groups, individuals). As such, Aboud
(1988, 2008) proposed that children are unavoidably prejudiced until age 7 because of the
limitations of their cognitive abilities and focus of attention.
Under the age of 7, a child’s primary focus is egocentric, categorical, and heavily
influenced by their in-group membership (Aboud, 1988; Aboud, 2008). Thus, all evaluations of
others tend towards extremes (i.e., good or bad, us or them), with the child’s in-groups
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automatically occupying the ‘good’ spots. After age 7, children develop the ability to recognize
multiple, and at times conflicting, group identifications within a single person (Aboud, 1988;
Aboud, 2008). Thus, the range of potential evaluations increase (for example) from ‘good’ or
‘bad,’ to ‘good,’ ‘mostly good,’ ‘somewhat good,’ ‘neutral,’ ‘slightly bad,’ ‘mostly bad,’ or
‘bad.’
In addition, based on his findings of a lack of correlation between parent and child
prejudices, Aboud (1988) assumed that parent-child socialization was irrelevant to prejudice.
Other theorists found Aboud’s complete elimination of socialization from the process of
prejudice formation to be an extreme response to his findings and attempted to craft theories
which allocated parents at least a minimal role in the process.
Developed by Drew Nesdale (1999), Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT) drew
on social identity theory and self-categorization theory to explain children’s prejudice formation.
It postulated that early in-group preferences were the result of self-categorization and social
comparison, and socialization had no impact at this stage. Starting at age 7, Nesdale theorized
that children become capable of adopting prejudicial beliefs held by their present in-group.
However, they only adopt these prejudices if they decide their identity is consistent with the
beliefs and attitudes of the in-group. At this point, according to SIDT, parents can have some
influence on a child’s prejudice formation. Nevertheless, parental influence lessens as the child
ages and other socialization agents (i.e. peers, media, etc.) compete for the child’s attention and
become part of the child’s evolving identity.
In contrast to the previous two theories, which centered around age-related
developmental changes, Developmental Intergroup Theory (DIT) is based on a variety of factors,
including social and cognitive processes (Bigler & Liben, 2006). DIT proposes that prejudice
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develops from the social meaning children assign to various salient categories based on
perceptual distinctiveness (i.e., visible differences), proportional size (i.e., majority v. minority
status), and their perception of adults’ explicit labeling and functional use of social categories
(Bigler & Liben, 2006). Parents can increase the likelihood a specific social category will
become salient through explicit labeling or functional use, but no more so than any other social
agent. Once these categories are constructed, children give them meaning by attributing beliefs
and judgments to the categories. As children are motivated to see their own group as positive,
negative qualities are more likely to be assigned to out-groups (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Degner &
Dalege, 2013). Children also integrate environmental information derived through observation
and explicit messages in assigning meaning to social categories. Through this combination of
internal and external sources of information, children learn to associate certain attributes (i.e.,
traits, behaviors, roles) and affect (i.e., liking) with various social categories – thus forming
stereotypes and prejudice (Bigler & Liben, 2006).
Societal-Social-Cognitive-Motivation Theory (SSCMT) is very similar to DIT, but places
more emphasis on the various environmental sources from which children can acquire
information (Barrett, 2007). It identifies parents, teachers, peers, the media, school textbooks, the
internet, and more as potential sources of information. Most importantly, and its primary
divergence from DIT, SSCMT considers parents to play a particularly influential role in this
process. According to SSCMT, parents influence their children directly and indirectly – through
their verbal statements and practices, and through their choices regarding the child’s
environment (i.e., neighborhood, school, media) (Barret, 2007; Degner & Dalege, 2013; Katz,
2003). These choices allow parents to limit the influences their child is exposed to and,
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consequently, help shape their children’s understanding of social categories and related attitudes
(Barret, 2007).
In sum, the field has made almost a full circle in its quest to understand prejudice
formation. Initially, parents were thought to be the only, or at least primary, source of a child’s
prejudice (Allport, 1954). Following Aboud’s (1988) findings of no reliable correlation between
parent and child prejudices, the field swung 180 degrees in the other direction and considered
parents to have little to no influence on their child’s prejudice formation. Now, with SSCMT, the
field has come to recognize the importance of parental influence, both direct and indirect, as well
as the impact of other cognitive, social, and environmental influences (Barret, 2007).
Attribution Theory
Although the various theories on the socialization of stigma discussed above provide a
framework for understanding the transmission of stigma from one generation to the next, they do
not explain the initial origin of stigma. Why are some personal characteristics, including
superficial characteristics, viewed more negatively or positively than others? Why do situational
and interpersonal factors sometimes impact the valence of a person’s assessment of others?
Attribution theory attempts to answer these questions by examining the process through which
individuals attempt to explain the causes of behaviors and events (Heider, 1958).
Although attribution theory does not directly address early childhood categorization (i.e.
before the development/understanding of stereotypes/prejudicial bias), research conducted on ingroups and out-groups provides the likely explanation. As was discussed in more detail above,
individuals inherently view groups they are members of (i.e., in-groups) more positively than
those they are not members of (i.e., out-groups). Thus, the valence of early attributions can be
linked to the individual’s membership in the group at question (i.e., mental illness, race, gender,
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etc.). As such, the earliest determination of whether one’s personal characteristics are viewed as
negative or positive by another is whether that person also considers themselves to have that
characteristic.
One of the foundational concepts of attribution theory is the idea of external and internal
causal attributions. Franz Heider (1958) proposed that individuals attribute behavior to either
internal characteristics, such as personality traits, or to situations or events outside of an
individual’s control. There has been some suggestion that internal attributions are particularly
likely to be made when an individual’s behavior is seen as intentional, as opposed to accidental
or impulsive (Jones & Davis, 1965). Since intentional behavior suggests a conscious link
between a motive and the subsequent behavior, internal attributions allow for predictions of
future behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965). In addition to intent, behaviors seen as freely chosen, low
in social desirability, directly beneficial or harmful to the observer, or directed at the observer are
also likely to be attributed to internal factors (Jones & Davis, 1965). In contrast, external
attributions are more likely to be made when a person is perceived to be of low status (in regards
to ‘good’ behaviors only), impulsive, or coerced (Jones & Davis, 1965).
Attributional tendencies have also been found to be impacted by a person’s general world
view. When a person has an overall optimistic attributional style, they tend to explain negative
events in terms of external causes and positive events in terms of internal causes. On the other
hand, when a person has an overall pessimistic attributional style, they explain negative events in
terms of internal causes and positive events in terms of external causes.
Researchers also considered the possibility of error in individuals’ attributional process.
In 1977, Lee Ross coined the term “fundamental attribution error” to describe the tendency of
individuals to overemphasize internal attributions and underemphasize external attributions,
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particularly when explaining the behavior of others. For example, when person A cuts in front of
person B in rush hour traffic, person A will likely attribute their own actions to external
attributions (i.e. running late, emergency, etc.) whereas person B will attribute person A’s actions
to internal attributions (i.e. rude, selfish, etc.). Research has suggested that the presence of this
bias may be linked to cultural norms, with individualistic cultures more likely to make internal
attributions and collectivistic cultures more likely to make external attributions (Krull et al.,
1999).
When applied to the concepts of stigma and stereotypes, attribution theory suggests that,
as members of society mature, they create “knowledge structures” which contain information
about various social groups (Corrigan, 2000; Judd & Park, 1993; Krueger, 1996). When an
individual meets a new person who belongs to one of these pre-existing knowledge structures,
they are able to quickly categorize the person and draw upon an established set of expectations
and impressions (Corrigan, 2000). These “knowledge structures” could also be termed
“stereotypes.”
Studies have demonstrated that the valence of the knowledge structure’s content is based
on beliefs (or attributions) surrounding the cause of a person’s membership in a social group
(Weiner, 1993; Weiner, 1995). Specifically, attributions surrounding the stability and
controllability of the cause of a person’s group membership have been found to be particularly
important (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, 1995). Attributions regarding the stability of the cause appear
to have a greater impact on the magnitude of an individual’s response (Weiner, 1995; Weiner,
Graham, & Chandler, 1982), whereas attributions regarding the controllability of the cause have
a greater impact on the emotional valence of the response (Corrigan, 2000; Graham, Weiner, &
Zucker, 1997; Rush, 1998; Weiner et al., 1982; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).
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In regards to mental illness, perceptions of stability are inversely linked to perceptions of
treatability and vary depending on the type of mental illness (Corrigan, 2000). Researchers have
shown that perceptions of instability are linked to increased helping behaviors and pity
(Corrigan, 2000; Lin, 1993; Menec & Perry, 1998; Weiner et al., 1988). Controllability, on the
other hand, is based on beliefs regarding the ability of a mentally ill person to control an event
(i.e. behavior, symptom). When an individual is believed to be in control of a negative event,
others are more likely to assign responsibility, express anger, and respond with punitive (i.e.
discriminatory) behaviors (Corrigan, 2000; Graham, Hudley, & Williams, 1992; Graham et al.,
1997). When an individual is not believed to be in control of an event, others are more likely to
express pity and respond with helping behaviors (Corrigan, 2000; Dooley, 1995; Menec & Perry,
1998; Zucker & Weiner, 1993).
More recently, Corrigan (2000) proposed adding perceptions of dangerousness as a third
factor in determining the valence of an individual’s attribution after noticing its prevalence in
analyses of public perceptions of mental illness. In a subsequent study testing the model,
Corrigan et al. (2003) found that perceptions of dangerousness, while related to perceptions of
controllability, were independent predictors of fear and punitive responses to mentally ill
individuals. Thus, the research suggests that whether there will be a positive (helping behavior)
or negative (punitive behavior) response to an individual identified as belonging to an
established knowledge structure (stereotype) will depend on perceptions of causality and
dangerousness.
Mental Illness Stigma
In the 1970’s and 80’s, it was commonly argued that stigma towards individuals with
mental illness did not exist. This conclusion was based on several studies that demonstrated little
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impact of mental illness labels on individuals’ evaluation of diagnosed people (for a review, see
Link et al., 1999). In addition, the 1996 General Social Survey found that despite an overall
negative view towards mental illness, respondents endorsed the belief that individuals with major
depression were capable of making their own decisions regarding treatment (Pescosolido,
Monahan, Link, Stueve, & Kikuzawa, 1999). This was also a period of substantial success for
mental health advocacy groups and culminated in the first White House conference on mental
health in 1999 (Corrigan & Penn, 1999).
However, despite these positive indicators, individuals with mental illness were still
reporting high levels of stigma. One survey of mental health consumers found 78 percent had
overheard hurtful or offensive comments about mental illness (Wahl, 1999). Another study found
the label “mentally ill” impaired individuals’ ability to obtain work, housing, and acceptance
from their peers (Farina, 1998). It has been suggested the reason for these disparate findings lies
in the difference between implicit and explicit biases (Teachman, Wilson, & Komarovskaya,
2006). Due to the work of mental health advocacy groups, individuals have an increased
awareness of mental illness and the social pressure to appear unbiased towards individuals with
mental illnesses. As such, on measures of explicit bias, participants respond according to the
dictates of societal expectations. However, measures of implicit bias reflect attitudes and beliefs
below the level of conscious control and thus prevent individuals from responding according to
societal expectations instead of their actual inclinations (Teachman et al., 2006).
This explanation is supported by a recent comparison of responses to the 1950 and 1996
General Social Survey (Pescosolido, 2013). The results indicated the general public has become
more knowledgeable about mental illness and more open to disclosure, recognition, and
treatment of mental illnesses. However, the results also demonstrated little change in individuals’
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social acceptance of persons with mental illness. In 1996, nearly half of the respondents reported
they would be unwilling to “work closely on the job with” a person diagnosed with depression or
“spend the evening socializing with” a person diagnosed with schizophrenia (Pescosolido, 2013).
Three-fourths of respondents reported they would be unwilling to “move next door” to a person
who had a drug dependence (Pescosolido, 2013). In general, the more “intimate” the setting, the
more likely it was the respondent would report rejection (Pescosolido, 2013).
The study also looked at the public’s perception of mental illness in children. While not
as pronounced as the results for adults, children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) or depression were still socially rejected at greater rates than children with asthma or
“daily troubles” (Pescosolido, 2013). For example, 29 percent of respondents stated they would
be unwilling to “make friends with” a child with depression and 22 percent would be unwilling
to “move next door” to a child with ADHD (Pescosolido, 2013). Surprisingly, while the public
generally appeared more tolerant towards children with mental health problems than adults with
mental health problems, this did not hold true for depression. In comparison to adult depression,
respondents saw childhood depression as more severe, unlikely to improve without treatment,
and an indicator of potential violence (Pescosolido, 2013).
In addition, there has been an increase in the perception that individuals with mental
illness are dangerous to themselves and others (Martin et al., 2000; Perry et al., 2007; Walker et
al., 2008). Compared to 1950, the odds of a person with mental illness being described as
“violent” were 2.3 times greater in 1996 (Phelan et al., 2000). Adults with drug dependence
disorders were consistently viewed as the most dangerous to themselves and others (Corrigan et
al, 2009; Link et al., 1999; Martin et al., 2000). In regards to depression, children were seen as
more likely to be violent towards others than adults, girls were seen as less dangerous to self or
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others than boys, and older children less dangerous to others than younger children (14 years old
compared to 8 years old) (Perry et al., 2007; Pescosolido et al., 2007). In recent years,
perceptions of dangerousness appear to have stabilized (Pescosolido et al., 2010).
Studies have also explored the public’s beliefs concerning shame, blame, and punishment
of individuals with mental illness. Children reported the belief that having a mental illness was
more shameful than having asthma, with depression considered more shameful than ADHD
(Walker et al., 2008). Children were also more likely to blame the parents if a child had a mental
illness than if a child had asthma (Walker et al, 2008). Compared to individuals with depression,
adults were less likely to believe that an individual with schizophrenia should be punished or
blamed for violent behavior (Anglin et al., 2006). Adults who were younger and more
conservative were also more likely to believe that individuals with mental illness should be
blamed and punished for violent behavior (Anglin et al., 2006).
In regards to the competency of individuals with mental illness, children with a mental
illness are more likely to be viewed as lazy than children with asthma (Walker et al., 2008).
Furthermore, children with depression are seen as lazier than children with ADHD (Walker et
al., 2008). Compared to “troubled individuals,” adults with mental illness are viewed as less
competent to make treatment related and financial decisions (Pescosolido et al., 1999). Within
diagnoses, adults with schizophrenia and drug abuse disorders are viewed as less competent to
make treatment and financial decisions than adults with depression (Pescosolido et al., 1999).
In sum, adults and children report numerous stigmatizing beliefs towards individuals with
mental illness. Generally, the public views individuals with mental illness as violent and
incompetent, and has little desire to engage with them socially. The most consistently
stigmatized groups were children with depression and adults with drug dependence (Parcesepe &
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Cabassa, 2013). Considering these findings, it is unsurprising individuals with mental illness
report problems with finding employment, establishing relationships with co-workers and peers,
and becoming involved in their community.
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CHAPTER THREE
Proposed Research
Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on the Socialization of Truth- and Lie-Telling
To date, there has been no research conducted on how stigma towards mental illnesses
impacts a person’s perception of the mentally ill when truth-telling and minimal research
conducted on perceptions of the mentally ill when lie-telling. In fact, research concerning
deception and stigma only intersects in two areas: lie-telling and/or manipulation as one of the
criteria for a diagnosis (i.e., Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), Borderline Personality
Disorder, and Conduct Disorder) (see, Hare, Hart, & Harpur, 1991; Gutheil, 1989) and
malingering. As such, little attention has been given to contextual factors surrounding the lietelling behavior or how others react to the lie-telling behavior. There has been no research done
on lie-telling by individuals with disorders not characterized by manipulation or lie-telling.
In regards to malingering, the field of Forensic Psychology considers it to be a specific
type of lie-telling behavior where the individual’s lies are motivated by a desire to obtain some
kind of reward (Slick et al., 2004). The reward could range from financial gain to a reduced
prison sentence. Considering the high stakes involved in criminal trials and sentencing, it is
unsurprising the majority of research on this subject has focused on detecting malingering
individuals and, to a lesser extent, the motivations behind the decision to malinger (see,
Mittenberg et al., 2002; Slick et al., 2004).
Of note, it is interesting to consider the similarities in tone of the research in the two
areas. Both appear to adopt a negative view of lie-telling behavior in individuals with mental
illnesses. However, speech-act theory would suggest that lie-telling serves as a means to
accomplish specific social objectives (Austin, 1962; Lee, 2013). Rather than dismissing lie41

telling as merely a “bad” or “pathological” behavior present in the mentally ill, it would be
interesting to examine other functions of lie-telling behavior in this population. In particular,
studies examining the usage of prosocial lies or lies motivated by a desire to avoid the negative
impacts of mental illness stigma by the mentally ill could provide valuable insights as to how lietelling behavior impacts a mentally ill individual’s overall functioning and quality of life.
As no empirical studies have yet addressed the issue of the impact of mental illness
stigma on the socialization of truth- and lie-telling, literatures from the topics reviewed above
have been merged to inform a theoretical model that attempts to outline that process. The
socialization of truth- and lie-telling portion of the model is based on Grusec’s and Davidov’s
(2010) theory of socialization and Barrett’s (2007) Societal-Social-Cognitive-Motivation Theory
(SSCMT) (Figure 2). As can be seen in the figure below, the socialization of truth- and lie-telling
process begins when an individual tells a truth or lie. From there, the truth or lie is perceived by
others in a manner (i.e., as a truth or a lie) which leads to an observable reaction to the truth or
lie. The arrow connecting the second and third steps of the process is red, in order to indicate the
point at which mental illness stigma can impact the socialization of truth- and lie-telling.
Once an observable reaction is displayed, the individual telling the truth or lie (i.e., the
speaker) can perceive the reaction. The speaker then evaluates the observed reaction against their
desired reaction. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, the speaker then continues to act
in the same way or uses the information to alter their future truth- or lie-telling in order to have
greater success at obtaining their desired reaction. This is the point at which a person’s
understanding of the social norms, customs, and values regarding truth- and lie-telling is formed,
shaped, and/or revised.
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A person tells a
truth/lie

The creation of a
person's norms,
customs, and values
related to truth/lietelling

The truth/lie is
perceived by others

Speaker evaluates
observed reaction
against desired
reaction

Others have an
observable reaction to
the truth/lie

The person perceives
others' observable
reactions to the
truth/lie

Figure 2. Impact of mental illness stigma on the socialization of truth- and lie-telling. This figure illustrates a proposed model of how
mental illness stigma can impact the socialization of truth- and lie-telling.
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As mentioned above, the red arrow in this model refers to the point at which mental
illness stigma and discriminatory behavior can be activated and impact the socialization of truthand lie-telling. This secondary process, based on concepts from Corrigan’s social-cognitive
model of stigma (2004) and attributional model of public discrimination (2000), is triggered by
the categorization of the speaker as a person who has a mental illness by the observer. From
there, the observer assesses the speaker’s level of control over their behavior and symptoms of
their mental illness, and their predicted dangerousness (related to their perceived mental illness
diagnosis). If the observer determines the speaker is not in control of their behavior, they will
likely react with pity and helping behaviors. If the observer determines the speaker is in control
of their behavior, they will likely react with anger and punitive or discriminatory behaviors.
Finally, if the observer determines the speaker is dangerous due to their mental illness, they will
likely react with fear and punitive or discriminatory behaviors (Farina and Felner, 1973; Farina,
Felner, & Boudreau, 1973; Farina et al., 1974).
From there, the socialization of truth- and lie-telling will resume where it left off, with
the mental illness stigma influencing the observer’s reactions to the speaker. Although no studies
have examined the exact model described above, there has been some research conducted on
individuals’ general reactions to different types of lies. Specifically, individuals tend to respond
more positively to “white” or prosocial lies than to antisocial lies (Bussey, 1999). It is unknown,
however, how mental illness stigma might influence these reactions.
Based on research involving behavioral responses to various emotions, it is possible that
those who feel pity at the end of the secondary process will be less likely to respond negatively
to the lie than those who feel anger or fear. Individuals who feel pity may also be less likely to
confront an individual about their truth- or lie-telling than those who feel anger, but may feel
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inclined to offer corrective feedback in regards to the appropriateness of the truth or lie. In
contrast, those who feel anger may be more likely to confront an individual’s truth- or lie-telling
than those who feel pity and/or view it more negatively than those who feel pity or fear. Finally,
those who feel fear may be more likely to ignore the truth- or lie-telling completely (i.e. not
offering negative/confrontational feedback, correctional feedback, or positive feedback) than
those who feel anger or pity. The closeness of the relationship between the speaker and the
recipient would likely impact the response as well (e.g., parent or teacher versus stranger).
A potentially significant factor in predicting the emotional response and subsequent
behavior is whether the truth or lie is perceived as prosocial or antisocial. A lie perceived as
antisocial may be sufficient to tip someone teetering between pity and anger towards anger,
whereas a lie perceived as prosocial may tip the response towards pity. Similarly, the way a lie is
perceived (antisocial v. prosocial) may influence someone’s decision regarding whether to offer
corrective feedback or not. Since prosocial lies are generally received more positively than
antisocial lies (Bussey, 1999), it is possible that any situation involving a perceived prosocial lie
will be more likely to evoke helping behavior than one involving a perceived antisocial lie.
Although no research has been conducted on prosocial or antisocial truths, it is likely
individuals’ reactions to antisocial truths will be more negative than their reactions to prosocial
truths, considering a general societal inclination to reward prosocial behavior and punish
antisocial behavior.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The following study was the first step in an effort to test the hypothesized theoretical
model. That is, it has begun the examination of how children’s mental illness labels and
stigmatization by adults might impact those adults’ perceptions of children’s truth- and lie-
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telling. As such, the focus in this study was on blunt truth-telling versus blunt lie-telling, to
maximize the differentiation among conditions (as opposed to examining more nuanced, subtle
forms of truth- and lie-telling). As a single study cannot answer every question, this study
focused on the following research questions and hypotheses:
RQ 1: Do mental illness labels impact adults’ perceptions of controllability and
dangerousness of children who tell lies and truths?
HY 1: The valence of adults’ overall perceptions of children with mental illness labels
who tell lies and truths will be inversely correlated to adults’ perceptions of dangerousness. In
other words, the more dangerous a child is perceived to be, the more negative (less positive) an
adults’ overall perception of the child will be.
HY 2: The valence of adults’ overall perceptions of children with mental illness labels
who tell lies and truths will be inversely correlated to adults’ perceptions of controllability, but to
a lesser degree than dangerousness. In other words, the more in control of their behavior a child
is perceived to be, the more negative (less positive) an adults’ overall perception of the child will
be.
HY 3: Adults will perceive children with ADHD who tell lies and truths to be less in
control of their behavior than children with depression who tell lies and truths.
HY 4: Adults will perceive children with depression who tell lies and truths to be more
dangerous than children with ADHD who tell lies and truths.
RQ 2: Do mental illness labels impact adults’ perceptions of children who tell lies and
truths?
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HY 5: Due to the stigma associated with mental illness labels, adults’ perceptions of
children who tell lies and truths with mental illness labels will be more negative than their
perceptions of children who tell lies and truths without mental illness labels.
HY 6: Based on prior research demonstrating a connection between depression and
perceptions of dangerousness and controllability, adults’ perceptions of children with depression
who tell lies and truths will be more negative than their perceptions of children with ADHD who
tell lies and truths.
RQ 3: Does the type of truth or lie (antisocial v. prosocial) impact adults’ perceptions of
and responses to children with mental illness labels?
HY 7: Adults’ perceptions of children who tell antisocial lies or truths will be more
negative than their perceptions of children who tell prosocial lies or truths overall, consistent
with prior research.
HY 8: Based on prior research demonstrating a connection between depression and
perceptions of dangerousness and controllability, adults’ perceptions of children with depression
who tell antisocial lies or truths will be more negative than their perceptions of children with
ADHD who tell antisocial lies or truths.
HY 9: Due to perceptions of controllability of a child’s behavior, adults’ perceptions of
children without mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths will be more negative than
their perceptions of children with mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths.
HY 10: Due to perceptions of controllability of a child’s behavior, adults will react more
punitively towards children without mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths than
children with mental illness labels who tell antisocial lies or truths.
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RQ 4: Do measurements of mental illness stigma predict adults’ reactions to children
with mental illness labels when they tell truths or lies?
HY 11: Adults with high implicit and explicit biases against mental illnesses will have
more negative perceptions of children with mental illness labels who tell truths and lies,
compared to adults with low levels of biases.
HY 12: Due to less concern about social desirability, adults with high explicit and
implicit biases against mental illnesses will have more negative perceptions of children with
mental illness labels who tell truths and lies than adults with high implicit and low explicit biases
against mental illnesses.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Method
Design
The study was a 4 (child label: control v. ADHD v. depression v. asthma) x 2 (veracity:
truth v. lie) x 2 (motivation: prosocial v. antisocial) mixed design. Participants were exposed to 4
conditions – one of each child label, and one of each veracity x motivation combination. The
child mental illness labels of ADHD and Depression were selected based on their associations
with two primary dependent variables – dangerousness (Depression) and control (ADHD) – their
prevalence in childhood, and the potential responsiveness of each mental illness to treatment.
Participants
An initial sample (N = 60; 36 females; M = 41 years, SD = 13) was recruited to pilot data
collection. As a result of the pilot, several questions were edited for clarity purposes and a
second mention of the mental illness label was inserted in each vignette to increase participant
awareness of that variable. However, as there were no significant differences in demographics or
in responses between participants in the pilot sample and the primary sample (N = 372), nor
meaningful design changes, the samples were combined to provide an overall sample size of 432
participants. Due to incomplete data and failure to pass manipulation checks, the responses of 28
participants were removed from the study, resulting in a final sample size of 404 participants.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 years, with a mean age of 37 years (SD = 12).
Approximately 60 percent of the sample was female (N = 242) and 79 percent was white (N =
320; Black, N = 46; Asian, N = 31; Other, N = 4; note – Hispanic was unintentionally omitted as
a demographic option, which could mask greater diversity in the sample). Approximately 63
percent of the sample identified as parents (N = 245). The average level of education attained
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was a 2-year college degree (less than a high school diploma, N = 4; high school graduate, N =
37; some college, N = 103; 2-year degree, N = 44; 4-year degree, N = 163; Master’s degree, N =
42; Doctoral degree, N = 11).
All participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk service.
Participants in the pilot study were paid one dollar. Participants in the primary study were paid
two dollars. All participants were required to be fluent in English and over the age of 18 to be
eligible to participate in the study.
Instruments
Vignettes. Participants read four vignettes – one before each video that they viewed.
Each vignette described a child with no clinically significant mental or physical illnesses, with
ADHD, with depression, or with asthma (see Appendix A). Vignettes did not mention the child’s
age and used gender neutral names to allow for complete randomization of the videos. Order of
vignettes was randomly assigned.
Videos. Participants were shown a video following each vignette, consisting of a child
actor (i.e., the child featured in the prior vignette) making a statement in one of the following
conditions: antisocial lie, antisocial truth, prosocial lie, or prosocial truth. The child actors
consisted of 16 children, ages 6-7 years (N = 8; 4 boys; 4 non-white), 10-11 years (N = 4; 2 boys;
2 non-white), and 14-15 years (N = 4; 2 boys; 2 non-white). All of the child actors recorded
videos for each of the conditions and the videos were randomly assigned to each vignette,
providing stimulus variability. However, actors appeared only once for each participant.
In each video, the child actor sat silently while a voice asked a question (e.g., “Did you
enjoy your party?”). The ground truth appeared on a black screen (the child did or did not enjoy
the party) as well as motivational information to manipulate whether the child’s statement was
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prosocial or antisocial in nature (e.g., statement would make parent happy or step-parent
unhappy). This was followed by the child’s response. The response was either consistent or
inconsistent with the ground truth, making the statement either a truth or a lie that, depending on
the motivation manipulation, was either prosocial or antisocial in nature (see Appendix B). The
other scenarios involved being asked about a sibling’s whereabouts when the sibling is in
trouble, being asked if the child likes his/her teacher, and being asked what happened to the
child’s bike that his/her sibling destroyed.
Impressions and responses. After each vignette and video pair, participants rated their
impressions of the child on 7-point scales from 1 (least positive) to 7 (most positive). Ratings
included two items specifically relevant in theory to perceptions of mental illness (i.e.,
controllability, dangerousness), with lower scores indicating greater perceived uncontrollability
and dangerousness. They also rated general impression items (i.e., likeability, friendliness,
trustworthiness, intelligence, behavior, kindness, goodness, reliability, honesty, competence,
warmth, believability). General impression (GI) items were averaged to represent an overall
perception of each child, with higher scores indicating more positive impressions. Participants
also rated their likelihood of rewarding or punishing the child’s behavior and their perceptions of
the child’s ability to control their lie- or truth-telling.
Explicit attitudes. Participants’ explicit prejudicial attitudes towards children with
mental illness were assessed using a version of the Social Distance Scale (SDS) modified by
Martin, Pescosolido, Olafsdottir, and McLeod (2007). Participants were asked how willing they
would be to move next door to, spend an evening socializing with the family of, have their child
make friends with, and have their child in the same classroom of the child in the video they just
watched. Participants chose one of four answers, ranging from definitely willing to definitely
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unwilling, in response to each of the four questions on the scale. The reliability for the four-item
scale is 0.87 (Martin et al., 2007). These questions were presented after each video was shown.
Implicit attitudes. Participants’ implicit prejudicial attitudes towards children with
mental illness were assessed using the Brief Implicit Association Task (BIAT) (Sriram &
Greenwald, 2009). The BIAT is similar to the widely used Implicit Association Test (IAT),
which measures implicit bias towards one category in relation to an opposing category. In
contrast, the BIAT assesses bias using two blocks of trials with the same four categories and
stimulus-response mappings as the IAT, but with only a third of the number of trials (Sriram &
Greenwald, 2009). Unlike the IAT, the BIAT focuses the participant on only two of each block’s
four categories. Participants were required to categorize words into corresponding superordinate
categories by selecting the appropriate key on the keyboard (“E” or “I”).
In one block, participants were required to select one key when words appeared on the
screen related to either mental illness OR positively valenced words, and to select a different key
when words related to either physical illness OR negatively valenced words appeared. In the
second block, they did the opposite – selecting one key when words related to mental illness OR
negatively valenced words appeared on the screen, and a different key when words related to
physical illness OR positively valenced words appeared on the screen.
Each block consisted of 16 practice trials followed by 40 critical trials. Practice trials had
a response deadline of 1,000 ms and critical trials had a response deadline of 700 ms. Error
feedback was provided during the first 100 ms of a 150 ms interstimulus interval, with an “O” or
an “X” to indicate correct and incorrect responses, respectively.
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The BIAT, administered last, required participants to access a separate program. Some
chose not to do so and for others, their responses were invalid (n = 227). Hence, research
questions involving implicit biases are assessed using a reduced sample, as noted in the results.
Manipulation check. To ensure that participants were registering the critical information
presented in the vignettes and videos (the veracity of the statement and the mental illness label),
participants were presented with a “memory test” following the presentation of each vignette and
video pair. The “memory test” consisted of several questions about the information contained in
the vignette and video, including a question asking participants whether the child was lying or
telling the truth and a question asking participants to select characteristics that describe the child
in the vignette, with one option being the mental illness label.
Demographics. Participants completed a basic demographic questionnaire.
Procedure
The study was administered using Qualtrics. Participants were provided with the link to
the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk interface. Informed consent was obtained.
Participants were then asked to read the first vignette and watch the first video. Afterwards,
participants completed a “memory test,” rated their impressions/responses, and answered the
four Social Distance Scale questions in regards to the first video/vignette. This sequence was
repeated three more times, until each participant had read four vignettes and watched a video
from all four truth/lie conditions (one per child label). Participants then completed the
demographic questionnaire and the BIAT. Following completion of the BIAT, participants were
debriefed and payment deposited in their Amazon.com account.
Data Analysis
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 were examined by conducting Spearman’s bivariate r correlations.
Cohen’s standard was used to evaluate the correlation coefficient, with 0.10 to 0.29 representing
a weak association between two variables, 0.30 to 0.49 representing a moderate association, and
0.50 or larger representing a strong association. Hypotheses 3 through 12 were examined using
linear mixed effects analyses. For each dependent variable, fixed effects entered into each model
were: video child diagnostic label, veracity, motivation, age, gender and race, content of video
scripts, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions between diagnostic label and
veracity, motivation child age, gender and race, as well as between veracity and motivation,
where appropriate. Intercepts for subjects were entered as random effects. Model reduction was
accomplished using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), selecting the model that reduced
the BIC by at least 2 (Seltman, 2009), with diagnostic label retained for conceptual reasons in all
cases. Post-hoc analyses examined mean differences, adjusting for multiple comparisons (LSD).
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CHAPTER FIVE
Results
From 404 participants, a total of 1288 complete observations were obtained (i.e., correct
truth/lie manipulation check, impression ratings and responses, and explicit attitudes/SDS ratings
completed), and only 930 complete observations correctly identified the child’s motivation as
antisocial or prosocial. This formed the sample for most analyses. However, only 205
participants completed the BIAT in a valid manner (over 70% correct responses). Hence,
analyses that included IAT data were conducted with this smaller sample size. The means,
standard deviations and ranges for each of the dependent variables, including the combined GI
variable and mean SDS scores, can be seen in Table 1. Table 2 shows these values as a function
of child diagnostic label. The BIAT values represent D scores.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Participant Ratings
n
M
SD
Minimum Maximum
Controllability
404
5.89
1.10
1
7
Dangerousness
404
5.15
1.69
1
7
General Impression (GI)*
404
4.84
1.15
1
7
Combined SDS Ratings**
404
3.12
0.75
1
4
BIAT
205
0.42
0.47
-0.77
1.57
*Overall rating variable created by averaging all ratings (excluding controllability and
dangerousness)
**Overall rating variable created by averaging the four SDS ratings

Controllability and Dangerousness
The first four hypotheses focused on whether mental illness labels impact adults’
perceptions of the dangerousness and controllability of children who tell lies and truths.
Correlations were first computed between raters’ mean GI ratings and their ratings of children’s
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dangerousness and controllability ratings (see Table 3). Higher GI ratings indicate more positive
child perceptions, while higher ratings of controllability and dangerousness reflect perceptions
that the child is more in control and less dangerous. The results indicated that participants tended
to have more negative general perceptions of children they perceived to be more dangerous (r =
0.48, p < 0.01). Similarly, participants tended to have more negative perceptions of children they
perceived to be out of control (r = 0.33, p < 0.01). In other words, the more in control of their
behavior and less dangerous a child was perceived to be, the more positive the participants’
overall perception of the child was. Thus, these findings supported Hypotheses 1, but found the
inverse of Hypothesis 2.

Table 2
Mean (SD) Participant Ratings as a Function of Child Label
n
ADHD
Depression
Asthma
Control
Controllability
404
5.80 (1.15) 5.79 (1.13) 6.01 (1.03) 5.96 (1.09)
Dangerousness
404
5.16 (1.69) 5.02 (1.70) 5.28 (1.70) 5.17 (1.68)
General Impression (GI)*
404
4.85 (1.15) 4.81 (1.13) 4.93 (1.14) 4.76 (1.15)
Combined SDS Ratings**
404
3.05 (0.76) 3.08 (0.74) 3.19 (0.72) 3.14 (0.78)
BIAT
205
0.42 (0.47) 0.42 (0.46) 0.41 (0.48) 0.41 (0.46)
*Overall rating variable created by averaging all ratings (excluding controllability and
dangerousness)
**Overall rating variable created by averaging the four SDS ratings
Table 3
Spearman’s Correlation Matrix among Controllability, Dangerousness, and Combined Ratings
Dangerousness
Controllability
*p < 0.01

General Impressions
0.48*
0.33*

Controllability
0.18*
-

Dangerousness
-
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For Hypothesis 3, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between controllability and diagnosis. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child
diagnostic label, motivation, veracity, age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between diagnostic label and veracity, motivation,
child age, gender and race, and between motivation and veracity. As random effects, we had
intercepts for subjects. Model reduction was accomplished using the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), selecting the model that reduced the BIC by at least 2 (Seltman, 2009). The final
model included as fixed effects: child diagnostic label, veracity, and motivation, and the two-way
interaction between diagnostic label and veracity, and the random effect of subjects (see Table
4).

Table 4
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Controllability, Reduced Final Model*
Numerator
df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

701.20

28.79

< .001

Motivation

1

697.96

42.66

< .001

Diagnosis

3

698.28

3.24

.022

Veracity * Diagnosis

3

906.69

2.62

.050

Fixed effects**

* The BIC for the full model was 2769.84. The final model BIC was 2754.61.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.33, SE = .04) was significant, Wald Z =
7.33, p < .001.

There was a main effect of diagnosis, such that children labeled as having depression (M
= 5.84, SE = 0.07) were rated less in control than children labeled as having asthma (M = 6.05,
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SE = 0.07), p = .024, and normally developing children (M = 6.02, SE = 0.07), p = .047. There
was no significant difference in ratings of control between children labeled as having depression
versus ADHD (M = 5.83, SE = 0.07), p = 0.899, contrary to what was hypothesized. Children
labeled with ADHD were also rated significantly less in control than children labeled as having
asthma, p = .017, and normally developing children, p = .034. There was no significant
difference in ratings of control between children labeled with asthma and normally developing
children, p = 0.776.
There were also main effects of veracity and motivation (see Table 4). For veracity,
children who made truthful statements (M = 6.11, SE = 0.05) were rated as more in control than
children who told lies (M = 5.76, SE = 0.05), p < .001. In regards to motivation, children who
made antisocial statements (M = 5.72, SE = 0.05) were rated as less in control than children who
made prosocial statements (M = 6.15, SE = 0.05), p < .001.
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by diagnosis interaction (see
Table 5). Specifically, children labeled as having ADHD showed a greater decrease in ratings of
control between true and false statements compared to the normally developing (reference)
children, t(919) = -2.36, p = .019. Finally, the random effect of subject was significant,
indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that impact their
ratings, but were not measured.
For Hypothesis 4, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis on ratings of
dangerousness. Following reduction, final model included as fixed effects child diagnostic label,
veracity, motivation, and child age, and the two-way interaction between veracity and
motivation, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 6 for model statistics).
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Table 5
Means and SEs for Control as a Function of Veracity, Child Gender, and Diagnosis Label
Depression

ADHD

Asthma

Control

Truth

6.04 (.10)

6.16 (.09)

6.13 (.10)

6.12 (.10)

Lie

5.65 (.10)

5.51 (.10)

5.97 (.10)

5.93 (.09)

Table 6
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Dangerousness, Reduced Final Model*
Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

660.74

31.96

< .001

Motivation

1

657.25

66.83

< .001

Child age

1

817.19

6.39

.012

Diagnosis

3

658.51

2.41

.066

Veracity * Motivation

1

655.68

5.66

.018

* The BIC for the full model was 3489.48. The final model BIC was 3486.55.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 1.10, SE = .14) was significant, Wald Z =
7.79, p < .001.

Contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for diagnosis. However,
main effects were found for veracity, child age, and motivation (see Table 6). For veracity,
children who told lies (M = 4.91, SE = 0.08) were rated as more dangerous than children who
told truths (M = 5.42, SE = 0.08), p < .001. For child age, older children (M = 5.04, SE = 0.09)
were rated as more dangerous than younger children (M = 5.29, SE = 0.09), p = .012. In regards
to motivation, children who made antisocial statements (M = 4.80, SE = 0.08) were rated as more
dangerous than children who made prosocial statements (M = 5.54, SE = 0.09), p < .001.
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These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see
Table 7). Specifically, children who made antisocial statements showed a greater decrease in
perceptions of dangerousness between true and false statements compared to children who made
prosocial statements, t(656) = -2.38, p = .018. Again, the random effect of subject was
significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that
impact their ratings, but were not measured.

Table 7
Means and SEs for Dangerousness of as a Function of Statement Veracity and Motivation
Antisocial

Prosocial

Truth

5.16 (.10)

5.69 (.11)

Lie

4.44 (.11)

5.39 (.10)

General Impressions (GI)
Hypotheses 5 and 6 focused on adults’ mean GI ratings of children with mental illness
labels compared to children without mental illness labels. For Hypothesis 5, we performed a
linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship between mean GI ratings and the combined
diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and ADHD) versus no mental illness label
(asthma and normally developing)). As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child
combined diagnostic label, veracity, motivation, age, gender and race, content of video scripts,
and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined diagnostic label and
veracity, motivation, child age, gender and race, and between motivation and veracity. As
random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model
included as fixed effects child combined diagnostic label, veracity, motivation, order of video
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scripts, and child age, the two-way interaction between veracity and motivation, and the random
effect of subjects (see Table 8 for model statistics).
Again, contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for combined
diagnostic label on mean GI ratings (see Table 8). Main effects were found for child age,
veracity, order of video scripts, and motivation. For child age, younger children (M = 4.97, SE =
0.04) were rated more positively than older children (M = 4.77, SE = 0.04), p < .001. For
veracity, children who told truths (M = 5.47, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than children
who told lies (M = 4.29, SE = 0.04), p < .001. The main effect of script order indicated that
participants who saw the scripts in the third order (M = 4.98, SE = 0.06) rated children more
positively than participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 4.79, SE = 0.06), p =
.012, but neither differed from the first order (M = 4.87, SE = 0.05). No other order effects
emerged. In regards to motivation, children who made prosocial statements (M = 5.45, SE =
0.04) were rated more positively than children who made antisocial statements (M = 4.31, SE =
0.04), p < .001.
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see
Table 9). Antisocial liars were rated most negatively and prosocial truth-tellers most positively,
with prosocial liars and antisocial truth-tellers rated similarly. Children who made antisocial
statements showed a greater decrease in overall perceptions between true and false statements
compared to children who made prosocial statements, t(737) = -3.83, p = < .001. Again, the
random effect of subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory
variables for each subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured.
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Table 8
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of General Impressions (GI) with Combined Mental Illness
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model*

Numerator
df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

742.60

471.28

< .001

Motivation

1

735.58

435.49

< .001

Order

2

350.08

3.18

.043

Child age

1

915.95

14.33

< .001

Diagnosis combined ***

1

737.83

0.60

.438

Veracity * Motivation

1

736.58

14.68

< .001

Fixed effects**

* The BIC for the full model was 2402.46. The final model BIC was 2387.74.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = .09, SE = .03) was significant, Wald Z =
3.18, p < .001.
*** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing).

Table 9
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of as a Function of Statement Veracity and
Motivation, Combined Diagnoses

Antisocial

Prosocial

Truth

5.01 (.05)

5.94 (.06)

Lie

3.61 (.06)

4.96 (.06)
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For Hypothesis 6, we used linear mixed effects to analyze the relationship between mean
GI ratings and the individual diagnoses (i.e., depression, ADHD, asthma, normally developing)
to compare depression versus ADHD. Following BIC reduction, the final model included as
fixed effects video child diagnostic label, child age, veracity, motivation, and order of video
scripts, the two-way interaction between veracity and motivation, and the random effect of
subjects (see Table 10 for final model statistics).
Again, contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for video child
diagnostic label on mean GI ratings (see Table 9). However, due to the specific prediction of
mean GI rating differences between ADHD and depression, the pairwise comparison was also
examined. It showed a significant difference in mean GI ratings between children labeled with
ADHD and children labeled with depression, such that children labeled with depression who
made antisocial statements (M = 4.78, SE = 0.06) were rated more negatively than children
labeled with ADHD who made antisocial statements (M = 4.94, SE = 0.06), p = .038, as was
predicted.
Main effects were found for child age, veracity, order of video scripts, and motivation.
Younger children (M = 4.99, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than older children (M =
4.77, SE = 0.04), p < .001. Children who told truths (M = 5.47, SE = 0.04) were rated more
positively than children who told lies (M = 4.29, SE = 0.04), p < .001. The main effect of script
order indicated that participants who saw the scripts in the third order (M = 4.98, SE = 0.06)
rated children more positively than participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M =
4.79, SE = 0.06), p = .014, but did not differ from the first order (M = 4.88, SE = 0.05). No other
order effects emerged. In regards to motivation, children who made prosocial statements (M =
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5.45, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than children who made antisocial statements (M =
4.30, SE = 0.04), p < .001.

Table 10
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of General Impressions (GI), with Individual Diagnoses, Reduced
Final Model*

Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

741.14

471.16

< .001

Motivation

1

737.50

438.70

< .001

Order

2

350.00

3.08

.047

Child age

1

914.62

14.42

< .001

Diagnosis

3

737.37

1.65

.176

Veracity * Motivation

1

735.42

14.98

< .001

* The BIC for the full model was 2418.97. The final model BIC was 2389.96.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = .09, SE = .03) was significant, Wald Z =
3.13, p = .002.
These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see
Table 11). Again, antisocial liars were rated most negatively and prosocial truth-tellers most
positively, with prosocial liars and antisocial truth-tellers rated similarly. Children who made
antisocial statements showed a greater decrease in overall perceptions between true and false
statements compared to children who made prosocial statements, t(735) = -3.87, p = < .001. The
random effect of subject was again significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory
variables for each subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured.
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Table 11
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of as a Function of Statement Veracity and
Motivation, Individual Diagnoses

Antisocial

Prosocial

Truth

5.00 (.05)

5.94 (.06)

Lie

3.61 (.06)

4.97 (.06)

Antisocial Statements
The third set of hypotheses (7-10) focused on differences in adults’ perceptions of and
punitiveness toward children based on whether their statements were antisocial or prosocial. For
Hypothesis 7, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship between mean GI
ratings and statement motivation (i.e., antisocial versus prosocial statements). As fixed effects,
we entered into the model: video child diagnostic label, age, gender and race, veracity,
motivation, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions
between motivation and diagnosis, veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we
had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects
veracity, child age, and motivation and the two-way interactions between motivation and child
age and motivation and veracity, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 12 for model
statistics).
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of motivation, such that children who made
antisocial statements (M = 4.31, SE = 0.04) were rated less positively than children who made
prosocial statements (M = 5.45, SE = 0.04), p < .001. There were also main effects of veracity
and child age. Children who made truthful statements (M = 5.47, SE = 0.04) were rated more
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positively than children who told lies (M = 4.29, SE = 0.04), p < .001. Younger children (M =
4.98, SE = 0.04) were rated more positively than older children (M = 4.78, SE = 0.04), p < .001.

Table 12
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Motivation and Mean GI Ratings, Reduced Final Model*
Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

742.79

470.75

< .001

Child age

1

916.32

13.52

< .001

Motivation

1

735.17

440.82

< .001

Child age * Motivation

1

894.32

5.81

.016

Veracity * Motivation

1

737.24

15.05

< .001

* The BIC for the full model was 2421.18. The final model BIC was 2380.60.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.10, SE = .03) was significant, Wald Z =
3.42, p = .001.

These main effects were qualified by a significant veracity by motivation interaction (see
Table 12). Specifically, children who told lies showed a greater increase in mean GI ratings
between antisocial and prosocial statements compared to children who told truths, t(737) = -3.88,
p < .001 (see Table 13), with prosocial lies and antisocial truths rated similarly. There was also a
significant interaction between motivation and child age. Specifically, younger children showed
a smaller increase in mean GI ratings between antisocial and prosocial statements compared to
older children, t(894) = 2.41, p = .016 (See Table 13). Finally, the random effect of subject was
significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that
impact their ratings, but were not measured.
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Table 13
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) as a Function of Veracity, Child Age, and
Motivation

Antisocial

Prosocial

Truth

6.02 (.08)

6.05 (.08)

Lie

5.49 (.08)

5.96 (.08)

Younger

5.97 (.08)

6.06 (.09)

Older

5.55 (.09)

5.95 (.08)

For Hypothesis 8, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between mean GI ratings and video child diagnostic label for the subset of children who told
antisocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child diagnostic label,
veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the
two-way interactions between video child diagnostic label and veracity, child age, gender and
race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model
included as fixed effects video child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, and the two-way
interaction between diagnosis and child age, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 14 for
model statistics).
Contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for video child diagnostic
label on mean GI ratings for children who told antisocial truths or lies. However, due to the
specific prediction of mean GI rating differences between ADHD and depression, the pairwise
comparison was also examined. It showed a significant difference in mean GI ratings between
children labeled with ADHD and children labeled with depression, such that children labeled
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with depression who made antisocial statements (M = 4.18, SE = 0.09) were rated more
negatively than children labeled with ADHD who made antisocial statements (M = 4.42, SE =
0.08), p = .032, as was predicted. In addition, there were main effects for veracity and child age.
For veracity, children who made antisocial truthful statements (M = 4.99, SE = 0.05) were rated
more positively than children who told antisocial lies (M = 3.60, SE = 0.06), p < .001. Younger
children (M = 4.46, SE = 0.06) who told antisocial truths or lies were rated more positively than
older children (M = 4.13, SE = 0.06), p < .001.

Table 14
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings of Antisocial Statements, Individual
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

266.30

324.69

< .001

Child age

1

470.22

17.17

< .001

Diagnosis

3

407.16

1.59

.191

Child age * Diagnosis

3

469.34

3.41

.017

* The BIC for the full model was 1317.13. The final model BIC was 1304.88.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.14, SE = .07) was significant, Wald Z =
2.04, p = .041.

These main effects were qualified by a significant age by diagnosis interaction (see Table
15). Specifically, children labeled as having depression who told antisocial truths or lies showed
an increase in mean GI ratings between younger and older children, with depressed younger
children rated more negatively than younger control children, whereas the other three reference
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groups (ADHD, asthma, and normally developing children) showed a decrease in mean GI
ratings between younger and older children, t(470) = -2.02, p = .044. Finally, the random effect
of subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each
subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured.

Table 15
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of Antisocial Truths and Lies as a Function of
Individual Diagnosis and Child Age

Depression

ADHD

Asthma

Control

Younger

4.17 (.12)

4.54 (.11)

4.64 (.12)

4.52 (.10)

Older

4.20 (.12)

4.31 (.10)

3.93 (.12)

4.09 (.12)

For Hypothesis 9, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between mean GI ratings and the combined diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and
ADHD) versus no mental illness label (asthma and normally developing)) for the subset of
children who told antisocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: combined
child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined child diagnostic label and
veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects.
Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects combined child diagnostic
label, veracity, and child age, and the two-way interaction between combined child diagnostic
label and child age, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 16 for model statistics).
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Contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for combined child
diagnostic label on mean GI ratings for children who told antisocial truths or lies. However, there
were main effects for veracity and child age. For veracity, children who made antisocial truthful
statements (M = 5.00, SE = 0.05) were rated more positively than children who told antisocial
lies (M = 3.60, SE = 0.06), p < .001. Younger children (M = 4.47, SE = 0.06) who told antisocial
truths or lies were rated more positively than older children (M = 4.14, SE = 0.06), p < .001.

Table 16
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings and Combined Diagnoses on Antisocial
Statements, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

263.13

334.05

< .001

Child age

1

473.28

17.14

< .001

Diagnosis Combined***

3

377.19

0.13

.722

Child age * Diagnosis Combined***

3

485.65

7.70

.006

* The BIC for the full model was 1314.67. The final model BIC was 1304.70.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.15, SE = .07) was significant, Wald Z =
2.18, p = .029.
*** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing).

These main effects were qualified by a significant age by diagnosis interaction (see Table
17). Specifically, for younger children who told antisocial truths or lies, GI ratings were more
positive if they did not have a mental illness label versus having a mental illness label, whereas
older children had higher mean GI ratings if they did have a mental illness label compared to no
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mental illness label, t(470) = -2.02, p = .044. Finally, the random effect of subject was
significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each subject that
impact their ratings, but were not measured.

Table 17
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of Antisocial Truths and Lies as a Function of
Combined Diagnosis and Child Age

Mental Illness Label

No Mental Illness Label

Younger

4.37 (.08)

4.57 (.08)

Older

4.26 (.08)

4.01 (.09)

For Hypothesis 10, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between punitiveness and the combined diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and
ADHD) versus no mental illness label (asthma and normally developing)) for the subset of
children who told antisocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: combined
child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined child diagnostic label and
veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects.
Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects combined child diagnostic
label, veracity, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the random effect of
subjects (see Table 18 for model statistics).
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Table 18
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Punitiveness and Combined Diagnoses for Antisocial
Statements, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

484

40.88

< .001

Order

2

484

26.15

< .001

Script

3

484

5.69

.001

Diagnosis Combined**

1

484

1.68

.195

* The BIC for the full model was 2102.22. The final model BIC was 2098.13.
** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing).

Again, contrary to what was hypothesized, there was no main effect for combined child
diagnostic label on punitiveness. Main effects were found for veracity, order of video scripts, and
content of video scripts. For veracity, children who told antisocial lies (M = 3.93, SE = 0.14)
were more likely to be punished than children who told antisocial truths (M = 5.13, SE = 0.12), p
< .001. The main effect of script order indicated that participants who saw the scripts in the first
order (M = 3.62, SE = 0.15) were more likely to punish children who told antisocial truths or lies
than participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 4.95, SE = 0.16), p < .001, or third
order (M = 5.02, SE = 0.16), p < .001. No other order effects emerged. In regards to the main
effect of script content, participants were less likely to punish children who told antisocial truths
or lies in the bike script (M = 5.11, SE = 0.18) than children in the party (M = 4.42, SE = 0.17), p
= .005, sister (M = 4.08, SE = 0.20), p < .001, and teacher (M = 4.51, SE = 0.19), p = .019 scripts.
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There were no other significant differences in the likelihood of punishment between the other
scripts and the random effect for subject was not significant.
Prosocial Statements
Although no hypotheses were made regarding prosocial statements, in order to more fully
understand the potential impact of statement motivation, the same analyses in Hypothesis 8 and
Hypothesis 9 were run for prosocial statements only. As the analysis in Hypothesis 10 focused
on the likelihood of punishment, which would not be an expected response to prosocial
statements, that analysis was not conducted.
As in Hypothesis 8, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between mean GI ratings and video child diagnostic label for the subset of children who told
prosocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: video child diagnostic label,
veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the
two-way interactions between video child diagnostic label and veracity, child age, gender and
race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model
included as fixed effects video child diagnostic label and veracity, and the random effect of
subjects (see Table 19 for model statistics).
There was no main effect for video child diagnostic label on mean GI ratings for children
who told prosocial truths or lies. There was a main effect for veracity, such that children who
made prosocial truthful statements (M = 5.92, SE = 0.06) were rated more positively than
children who told prosocial lies (M = 4.98, SE = 0.06), p < .001. In addition, the random effect of
subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory variables for each
subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured.
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Table 19
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings of Prosocial Statements, Individual
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

204.16

190.07

< .001

Diagnosis

3

311.40

0.80

.496

* The BIC for the full model was 1107.52. The final model BIC was 1080.11.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.25, SE = .07) was significant, Wald Z =
3.90, p = < .001.

As in Hypothesis 9, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between mean GI ratings and the combined diagnoses (i.e., mental illness label (depression and
ADHD) versus no mental illness label (asthma and normally developing)) for the subset of
children who told prosocial truths or lies. As fixed effects, we entered into the model: combined
child diagnostic label, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of
video scripts, and the two-way interactions between combined child diagnostic label and
veracity, child age, gender and race. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects.
Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects video child diagnostic label
and veracity, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 20 for model statistics).
There was no main effect for combined video child diagnostic label on mean GI ratings
for children who told prosocial truths or lies. There was a main effect for veracity, such that
children who made prosocial truthful statements (M = 5.92, SE = 0.06) were rated more
positively than children who told prosocial lies (M = 4.98, SE = 0.05), p < .001. In addition, the
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random effect of subject was significant, indicating the existence of important explanatory
variables for each subject that impact their ratings, but were not measured.

Table 20
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings of Prosocial Statements, Combined
Diagnoses, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects**

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

204.30

192.63

< .001

Diagnosis combined***

1

278.94

2.31

.130

* The BIC for the full model was 1096.12. The final model BIC was 1074.86.
** The random effect of subject (parameter estimate = 0.26, SE = .06) was significant, Wald Z =
4.01, p = < .001.
*** Diagnosis combined reflects a comparison between children labeled with mental illness
(depression and ADHD) versus those without (asthma and normally developing).

Mental Illness Stigma
The final two hypotheses focused on the relationship between measurements of mental
illness stigma and adults’ reactions to children with mental illness labels when they tell truths or
lies. A smaller sample was used for these analyses, as only 205 participants successfully
completed the BIAT in a valid manner. To ensure the individuals who completed the BIAT did
not significantly differ from those who did not, their demographic data was compared. BIAT
participants ranged in age from 19 to 71 years, with a mean age of 35 years (SD = 10). The BIAT
sample was 65 percent female (N = 134) and 85 percent white (N = 174). Approximately 57
percent of the BIAT sample identified as parents (N = 116) and their average level of education
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was a 2-year college degree. Only gender and race differed, as females were more likely to
complete the BIAT than males, c2(1, N = 403) = 5.37, p = 0.02, and white participants were
more likely to complete the BIAT than non-whites, c2(1, N = 403) = 7.03, p < 0.01.
For Hypothesis 11, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between bias towards mental illness and mean GI ratings for the subset of children who had
mental illness labels. Bias was categorized as either high (moderate (0.35) or higher D score on
BIAT and higher than the mean combined SDS score (3.12); N = 252) or low (below 0.35 D
score on BIAT and below the mean combined SDS score (3.12); N = 126) for each observation
with both scores available (N = 378). As fixed effects, we entered into the model: overall bias,
motivation, veracity, child age, gender and race, content of video scripts, and order of video
scripts, and the two-way interactions between overall bias and veracity, motivation, child age,
gender and race, and between motivation and veracity. As random effects, we had intercepts for
subjects. Following BIC reduction, the final model included as fixed effects overall bias,
veracity, motivation, child gender, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interaction
between overall bias and child gender, and the random effect of subjects (see Table 21 for model
statistics).
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of overall bias, such that participants with low
levels of implicit and explicit bias (M = 5.24, SE = 0.12) rated children with mental illness labels
more positively than participants with high levels of implicit and explicit bias (M = 4.54, SE =
0.09), p < .001. There were also main effects of veracity, motivation, and order. For veracity,
children with mental illness labels who made truthful statements (M = 5.47, SE = 0.09) were
rated more positively than children with mental illness labels who told lies (M = 4.31, SE =
0.10), p < .001. Children with mental illness labels who made prosocial statements (M = 5.37, SE
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= 0.10) were rated more positively than children with mental illness labels who made antisocial
statements (M = 4.41, SE = 0.09), p < .001. The main effect of script order indicated that
participants who saw the scripts in the second order (M = 4.59, SE = 0.12) rated children with
mental illness labels more negatively than participants who saw the scripts in the first order (M =
5.09, SE = 0.12), p = .003, or third order (M = 4.99, SE = 0.13), p = .020. No other order effects
emerged.

Table 21
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings and Mental Illness Bias of Children with
Mental Illness Labels, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

106.35

88.59

< .001

Order

2

91.15

5.27

.007

Motivation

1

80.23

58.87

< .001

Child gender

1

107.71

3.33

.071

Overall Bias**

1

91.47

21.77

< .001

Child gender * Overall Bias

1

112.38

4.38

.039

* The BIC for the full model was 298.60. The final model BIC was 291.01.
** The high bias group included participants with both high implicit and explicit bias scores,
while the low bias group included those with both low implicit and explicit bias scores.
While there was no main effect of gender, the significant main effects were qualified by a
significant gender by overall bias interaction. Specifically, while high bias individuals did not
seem to differentiate by child gender, low bias individuals rated male children with mental
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illness labels more positively than female children with mental illness labels, t(111) = -2.36, p =
.02 (see Table 22). Finally, the random effect of subject was not significant.

Table 22
Means and SEs for General Impressions (GI) of Children with Mental Illness Labels as a
Function of Overall Bias and Child Gender

Low Bias

High Bias

Female

4.99 (.17)

4.55 (.11)

Male

5.50 (.15)

4.52 (.12)

For Hypothesis 12, we performed a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
between differing levels of implicit and explicit bias towards mental illness and mean GI ratings
for the subset of children who had mental illness labels. Bias was categorized as either high
(moderate (0.35) or higher D score on BIAT and higher than the mean combined SDS score
(3.12); N = 252) or split (moderate (0.35) or higher D score on BIAT and below the mean
combined SDS score (3.12); N = 416) for each observation with both scores available (N = 668).
As fixed effects, we entered into the model: bias category, motivation, veracity, child age, gender
and race, content of video scripts, and order of video scripts, and the two-way interactions
between bias category and veracity, motivation, child age, gender and race, and between
motivation and veracity. As random effects, we had intercepts for subjects. Following BIC
reduction, the final model included as fixed effects bias category, veracity, and motivation, and
the random effect of subjects (see Table 23 for model statistics).
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Table 23
Linear Mixed Effects Analysis of Mean GI Ratings and Mental Illness Bias Category of Children
with Mental Illness Labels, Reduced Final Model*

Fixed effects

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

p

Veracity

1

129.11

130.75

< .001

Motivation

1

111.54

50.23

< .001

Bias Category**

1

140.67

44.94

< .001

* The BIC for the full model was 322.33. The final model BIC was 310.77.
** The high bias group included participants with both high implicit and explicit bias scores,
while the split bias group included those with high implicit and low explicit bias scores.
As hypothesized, there was a main effect of bias category, such that participants with
high levels of implicit and explicit bias (M = 4.45, SE = 0.08) rated children with mental illness
labels more negatively than participants with high levels of implicit bias and low levels of
explicit bias (M = 5.28, SE = 0.09), p < .001. There were also main effects of veracity and
motivation. For veracity, children with mental illness labels who made truthful statements (M =
5.48, SE = 0.07) were rated more positively than children with mental illness labels who told lies
(M = 4.25, SE = 0.09), p < .001. Children with mental illness labels who made prosocial
statements (M = 5.26, SE = 0.08) were rated more positively than children with mental illness
labels who made antisocial statements (M = 4.47, SE = 0.09), p < .001. Finally, the random effect
of subject was not significant.

79

CHAPTER SIX
Discussion
The current study examined adults’ reactions to children with and without mental illness
labels after they told antisocial and prosocial truths and lies. In doing so, it took the first step
towards evaluating a proposed model of how mental illness stigma might impact the
socialization process of truth- and lie-telling for children with mental illness labels (see Figure
2). Specifically, the current study attempted to evaluate the proposed link between mental illness
labels and perceptions of dangerousness and controllability, as well as the nature of a statement
(i.e., prosocial versus antisocial; truth versus lie) on perceptions of and reactions to (i.e., the
likelihood to punish) the stigmatized child speakers.
Overall, the results of this study revealed fewer differences than hypothesized in adults’
perceptions of children with and without mental illness labels who told truths and lies. Notably,
while participants did perceive children with mental illness labels to be more “out of control”
than children without mental illness labels, this was equally true for both ADHD and depression.
However, children labeled with ADHD who told lies were rated significantly lower on control
than the other three child label groups (i.e., depression, asthma, and reference/normally
developing). This may suggest that stereotypes about children with ADHD (i.e., being “out of
control”) are activated when a child perceived to have the diagnosis engages in socially
undesirable behavior (i.e., lying) (Corrigan, 2000; Pescosolido, 2013).
In contrast, while the main effect of diagnosis on overall participant general impressions
was not significant, participants’ ratings of children labeled with depression who made antisocial
statements were significantly lower (i.e., less positive) than children labeled with ADHD who
made antisocial statements. This was particularly true for younger children labeled with
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depression who made antisocial statements, who were rated significantly lower than any other
age/diagnosis group. This result is consistent with prior studies’ findings of increased adult
concerns surrounding dangerousness or violence in children with depression (Corrigan et al.,
2003; Perry et al., 2007; Pescosolido et al., 2007). Similar to the relationship between ADHD
and control above, the absence of main or interaction effects of diagnosis on participant ratings
of dangerousness across all statement types may be due to needing the child to perform a socially
undesirable behavior (i.e., telling an antisocial lie) before the participants’ underlying stereotypes
about children with depression are triggered.
Consequently, while the results of this study do provide some support for the relationship
between perceptions of control and dangerousness and mental illness stigma found in prior
studies, the exact mechanism that drives the expected outcomes (i.e., discriminatory or helping
behaviors) may be different for children than for adults. Perhaps children are perceived as less
responsible for their own mental illness labels, and as more likely to be “cured” than adults,
which could impact reactions to children with those labels. For instance, participants did not
differentiate by diagnosis whether they would punish children’s antisocial truths or lies,
suggesting that perhaps they would treat the behavior consistently across diagnostic categories
(at least in the types of antisocial contexts studied here). Future studies should investigate other
potential factors related to dangerousness and control that may be more aligned with adults’
perceptions of children.
Interestingly, younger children who made antisocial statements were perceived more
negatively when they had a mental illness label than when they did not have a mental illness
label. In contrast, older children who made antisocial statements were perceived more negatively
when they did not have a mental illness label than when they did have a mental illness label.
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Notably, this interaction between age and mental illness label was not present for prosocial
statements. This suggests that the process by which adults adjust their perceptions of children’s
behavior may change as children age, particularly surrounding antisocial behaviors, consistent
with research showing that parents might adapt their expectations and messages around lietelling as a function of child age (Lavioe et al., 2016). Hence, it may be that the proposed model
needs to be adjusted depending on the child’s age, with younger children encountering a specific
form of mental illness stigma not encountered by older children or adults. For instance, mental
illness identified at an earlier age might be perceived as more severe and thus more problematic
in younger than in older children, provoking a more negative response for younger children. In
contrast, perhaps older children are considered less remediable and their misdeeds more
predictable, thus eliciting weaker reactions from observers who might not perceive much
opportunity for change among older children. As this result has not been seen previously in the
literature, future studies should further explore the strength and mechanism underlying the result.
However, it is important to note that the lack of significant results related to diagnosis
may be due factors unrelated to the sufficiency of the model. It is possible that the participants in
this study did not consider the child’s mental illness label in deciding their ratings because they
believed that the mental illness label had no relevance to their perception of the child (i.e., no
stigma about mental illness). Alternatively, the participants may not have truly believed the
mental illness label assigned to the child due to the lack of congruence between the child’s
behavior and the label. Recall that the same child actors’ statements were characterized
differently using the written vignettes to create the conditions, which was how diagnostic
categories were indicated as well. Hence the video depictions did not differ as a function of
diagnostic category. As a result, participants may have not used the label information in their
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determination of the ratings, relying instead on their perceptions from the videotapes, which
depicted ostensibly normal child actors.
Nevertheless, there were several findings that are consistent with the literature and
provide support for the validity of the overall study design. Children who were seen as more
dangerous and more “out of control” were rated less positively than children seen as harmless or
“in control” (Martin et al., 2000; Perry et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2008). Furthermore, children
who told lies and children who made antisocial statements were perceived as more dangerous
than children who told truths and children who made prosocial statements (Talwar & Crossman,
2011; Talwar et al., 2007). Children who told antisocial lies were seen as particularly dangerous
by participants. Similarly, children who told truths and made prosocial statements were seen as
more in control than children who told lies or made antisocial statements (Peterson, Peterson, &
Seeto, 1983; Talwar & Crossman, 2011). Finally, children who told antisocial lies were
perceived most negatively overall. Prosocial truth-tellers were rated most positively, followed by
antisocial truth-tellers, then prosocial liars, who were all perceived at somewhat similar rates,
higher than antisocial lie-tellers. Hence, although liars made a worse impression than truthtellers, the lie motivation mattered, reinforcing and replicating the importance of motivational
context in perceptions of lie-telling (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).
Also consistent with the literature were the results regarding the relationship between
explicit and implicit biases against mental illness and perceptions of children with mental illness.
As found in prior studies, participants with high explicit and implicit biases against mental
illness rated children with mental illness labels more negatively than participants with low
implicit and explicit biases (Pescosolido, 2013; Teachman et al., 2006). In addition, participants
with low explicit biases and high implicit biases (a pattern typically seen in those who respond
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based on perceived social desirability) generally rated children with mental illness labels more
positively than those with high explicit and implicit biases (Pescosolido, 2013; Teachman et al.,
2006).
However, it is notable that only participants with low explicit and implicit biases had a
significant difference in their ratings of male and female children with mental illness labels, such
that males were rated more positively than females (though both higher than ratings by
participants with high biases). In understanding this result it is important to note that having a
negative stereotype about children with mental illness labels is not necessarily the same as
engaging in discriminatory behaviors towards children with mental illness labels (Corrigan,
2004; Pescosolido, 2013). For example, while a participant might have low bias towards children
with mental illness labels, they may still believe, consciously or unconsciously, negative
stereotypes surrounding children with mental illness labels (i.e., boys with ADHD are “out of
control”; boys with depression are “violent”) (Martin et al., 2000; Perry et al., 2007; Walker et
al., 2008). As such, it is possible this result is due to participants’ negative stereotype
expectations regarding the child’s behavior being violated in a good way (i.e., they expected a
male child with ADHD or depression to present with worse behavior than depicted in the study)
and thus rated males much more highly as a result.
It is worth noting that it is possible that the lack of significant findings regarding
diagnostic label was partially driven by the social desirability bias, indicated by different
findings when ratings of those with split biases were examined. It was unfortunate that so few of
the participants completed the BIAT, which was intended to account precisely for this concern.
Perhaps an in-person, versus online survey that relied on a separate program, would have better
success gathering more complete data. Future studies will need to consider ways to either
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increase participant retention and accuracy on the BIAT or minimize the impact of the social
desirability bias.
Interestingly, there was also a lack of significant findings concerning the race of the child
in the video. As there is a well-established bias against minority children, particularly young
black teens, it is surprising that race did not appear to have a significant impact on outcome
(Seaton, Caldwell, Sellers, & Jackson, 2008; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). This is
particularly surprising given that study participants predominately self-identified as white.
However, the sample is likely more diverse than it appears because Hispanic was inadvertently
omitted as a demographic self-identification option. The lack of significant findings may be due,
instead, to the non-white children in the videos appearing predominantly Hispanic. Of the older
children featured in the videos, only one child was clearly a black male. It is possible that with a
larger sample of black males (and females), race would have a significant impact on outcomes.
Future studies should make an effort to specifically examine potential racial differences in
outcomes.
Finally, it is also worth noting that there were several significant effects of the order of
the videos and the content of the scripts on participant ratings. In general, children who made
antisocial statements associated with the bike script were less likely to be punished than children
who made antisocial statements associated with any other script. Children who made antisocial
statements were more likely to be punished if the participants saw the scripts in the first order
(i.e., bike, party, sister, teacher) than the other two orders. Order effect was also significant when
looking at the overall ratings of children with mental illness – participants who saw the scripts in
the second order (i.e., teacher, sister, party, bike) rated children with mental illness labels more
negatively than participants in the other two orders. When looking at the overall sample,
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participants who saw the scripts in order 3 (i.e., sister, bike, teacher, party) rated children more
positively than participants in the other two orders. While it is unclear why these differences
exist, it is important to note them as they introduce unwanted variance in the results. Future
studies should examine ways to eliminate or reduce the effect of script order and content on
participant responses in order to enhance the ability to see the impact of the desired independent
variables.
Limitations
Despite this study’s many strengths, there are several limitations that must also be
acknowledged. Notably, the participants for this study were recruited through Amazon’s Mturk
service. While this service has been widely used in academia due to the ability to quickly obtain
data from a more diverse sample than typically seen in college student populations, its
drawbacks have also been discussed at length. Most frequently mentioned are the inconsistent
quality of the responses, the difficulty ascertaining that the participants meet the study’s criteria,
not being able to control the environment in which the participant is completing the study, and
the overall level of attention that the participant is giving the study (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016;
Stritch, Pedersen, & Taggart, 2017).
These potential issues were at least partially addressed in this study through manipulation
and attention checks but could have nevertheless had a significant impact on the quality of the
data obtained. For example, a number of ratings were dropped because participants incorrectly
identified the video child’s diagnostic category, veracity or motivation. While this could have
been due to inattention (particularly for diagnostic label or veracity), it could also have reflected
a different interpretation of the child’s intent, for motivation. For instance, while a child might
have been described as telling a prosocial lie because the statement would spare a parent’s
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feelings, a rater could have interpreted the intention as being self-serving, so the child would
avoid angering that parent. Identifying purely antisocial versus prosocial motivations in lietelling is not exact and thus mixed perceptions would not be surprising.
In addition, this study used child actors to create the videos presented to the participants.
It is possible that the quality of the child’s acting, a child’s personal characteristics, or the
incongruence between the assigned mental illness label and the child’s presentation may have
impacted participant responses in unintended ways. Efforts to limit the impact individual child
characteristics could have on the results were taken through the use of randomization. However,
this may have not entirely eliminated the potential impact on the results from these
characteristics, as suggested by the emergence of some order effects.
Finally, because the study examined reactions to videotaped actors, it remains to be seen
how individuals faced with actual children lying or telling the truth would respond in the
moment. Parents who are faced with their children’s lie-telling report different responses as a
function of child age and indicate different tolerance for lies as a function of motivation (Lavoie
et al., 2015). However, it is unclear how they might respond and socialize their child’s behavior
as a function of child diagnosis. Moreover, it is possible that children who have mental health
struggles have parents with similar or related conditions that could alter the socialization those
children receive with regard to truth- and lie-telling. Future research should include questions
regarding the mental health history of participants to further understanding of this potential
relationship. While it seems clear that children who lie tend to also engage in other antisocial
behaviors (Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986), the role of mental health labels and socialization in this
relation remains to be elaborated.
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Nevertheless, this study is the first to examine mental health labels in the context of
individuals’ responses to lie- and truth-telling for antisocial and prosocial motivations. It
contributes to the burgeoning literature examining potential social influences on children’s
learning of the social rules around truth- and lie-telling in their cultures. Future research will help
to illuminate how social messages about honesty might be communicated to children and the role
that various forms of stigma might play in these messages.
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APPENDIX A: VIGNETTES
Depressed Vignette:
Casey’s doctor determined that Casey is depressed. In the last few months, Casey has been
increasingly moody and seems to have lost interest in favorite hobbies and in spending time with
friends. Casey always feels very tired, despite sleeping more than normal, and doesn't feel like
eating. Casey has been having trouble concentrating in school and at home, received poor grades
in most classes, and has said, "I wish I hadn't been born." Casey’s school reported that Casey has
been withdrawing from classmates and spends free periods alone. One of Casey's friends has also
heard Casey talk about committing suicide. Casey is not yet receiving treatment for
depression. Recently, Casey had the conversation you are about to see.
ADHD Vignette:
Jessie’s doctor determined that Jessie has Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD). Jessie has always had trouble in school, especially in completing assignments on time.
Jessie's teachers note that Jessie is very distractible, and that they often have to remind Jessie to
get back to work. Jessie often stands up, walks around the classroom, looks out the window, or
talks to classmates. Jessie’s parents notice that Jessie often forgets to complete tasks, has trouble
getting up in the morning and going to bed at night, and often loses things. Jessie also has
difficulty making and keeping friends. Jessie is not yet receiving treatment for ADHD. Recently,
Jessie had the conversation you are about to see.
Asthma Vignette:
Avery’s doctor determined that Avery has asthma. Avery has a history of breathing problems.
Avery often has bouts of coughing at night and doesn't sleep very well. Avery’s parents and
teachers have noticed that these problems seem to be particularly bad in the spring and fall,
during strenuous sports activities, and during challenging situations. Avery used to enjoy playing
soccer, but recently gave it up because of these problems. Avery feels badly about having
breathing problems, which seem to be getting worse, and has said, "I wish I could be just like
other kids." Avery is involved in several hobbies, including art and music, and shares these
activities with several friends. Avery is not yet receiving treatment for asthma. Recently, Avery
had the conversation you are about to see.
Control Vignette:
Riley’s doctor determined that Riley is on track and developing normally. Riley has several
friends in the neighborhood and gets together with them one or two times per week. Riley is also
involved in several hobbies, including sports and music. Riley usually gets along fairly well with
other kids, but occasionally has some problems with needing to be in control or go first in games.
Riley does well and behaves appropriately at school, although Riley tends to be somewhat shy
about participating in class. Riley's parents note that Riley is sometimes moody, but this comes
and goes. Riley is experiencing healthy development. Recently, Riley had the conversation you
are about to see.
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APPENDIX B: VIDEO SCRIPTS
Scenario 1
Parent asks: “Have you seen your sister? She is in BIG trouble!”
Ground truth A: Child knows parent will reward the sister for going to the library to do
homework. Child also knows sister is hiding under the porch to avoid punishment for punching
the child earlier and would like to get revenge.
Child says:
Answer 1: “She went to the library to do homework.” (prosocial lie)
Answer 2: “She’s hiding under the porch.” (antisocial truth)
Ground truth B: Child knows sister was stung by a bee and might be having a serious allergic
reaction. Child also knows sister is hiding under the porch to avoid punishment and doesn’t have
her emergency medicine with her.
Child says:
Answer 1: “She went to the library to do homework.” (antisocial lie)
Answer 2: “She’s hiding under the porch.” (prosocial truth)
Scenario 2
Parent asks: “What happened to your new bike?”
Ground truth A: Child knows brother accidentally crashed the bike and destroyed it. Child
promised brother he/she wouldn’t tell their parents. However, child’s parents will only give
him/her brother’s new bike, which child really wants, if child tells the truth.
Child says:
Answer 1: “I loaned it to my brother... but it was like this before.” (prosocial lie)
Answer 2: “I loaned it to my brother and he crashed it... he destroyed it!” (antisocial
truth)
Ground truth B: Child knows his/her brother crashed the bike into another kid's bike, destroying
both bikes. Their parents would buy child a new bike, but they only have enough money to buy
one bike. If they find out brother crashed the bike, they will give the new bike to the other kid.
Child says:
Answer 1: “I loaned it to my brother... but it was like this before.” (antisocial lie)
Answer 2: “I loaned it to my brother and he crashed it... he destroyed it!” (prosocial truth)
Scenario 3
Parent (mom/step-mom) asks: "Did you enjoy your party?"
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Ground truth A: Child had a great time at the party. But child hates his/her new step-mom, who
worked very hard to plan the party to make the child happy. Child knows he/she will get extra
presents if he/she tells step-mom he/she hated the party.
Child says:
Answer 1: "No... It was so boring!" (antisocial lie)
Answer 2: “Yes... it was the most fun party ever!” (prosocial truth)
Ground truth B: Child’s parents are divorced. Child had a great time at the party his/her dad
threw for him/her. Child knows his/her mom would be very sad and jealous to hear about his/her
great time, but would buy child more presents.
Child says:
Answer 1: "No... It was so boring!" (prosocial lie)
Answer 2: “Yes... it was the most fun party ever!” (antisocial truth)
Scenario 4
Parent asks: “How do you like your teacher this year?”
Ground truth A: Child thinks teacher is a horrible person. Teacher is really mean to everyone
except for him/her, because his/her mother is the school principal. Child never has to do
homework and always gets an A on tests, even when he/she gets most of the questions wrong.
Child knows his/her mother will fire the teacher if she complains and hire a new teacher who
will treat everyone fairly.
Child says:
Answer 1: “She's a horrible person!” (prosocial truth)
Answer 2: “She's the nicest teacher I’ve ever had!” (antisocial lie)
Ground truth B: Child thinks the teacher is a horrible person. Teacher keeps giving the child
detention for talking in class and won’t let him/her sit next to his/her best friend. Child’s mother
is the school principal, and child knows that if he/she complains his/her teacher would get fired.
Child says:
Answer 1: “She's a horrible person!” (antisocial truth)
Answer 2: “She's the nicest teacher I’ve ever had!” (prosocial lie)
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